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Financial dollarisation, defined as the holding by residents of foreign currency 
assets and liabilities, has been placed at the forefront of the policy debate in 
developing economies. The reasons include its alleged influence on the conduct of 
monetary policy and, most prominently, the deleterious impact of exchange rate 
depreciations on the solvency of dollar debtors (the balance sheet effect). However, 
the vast analytical literature on these issues contrasts with the scarcity of empirical 
work to support or refute these implications. This paper contributes to fill this gap. 
Using a new updated database, the paper revisits the evidence on the determinants of 
financial dollarisation, and tests whether the impact on monetary and financial 
stability, and economic performance predicted by the theory is verified in the data. It 
finds that financially dollarised economies display a more unstable demand for 
money, a greater propensity to suffer banking crises after a depreciation of the local 
currency, and slower and more volatile output growth, without significant gains in 
terms of domestic financial depth. In this light, the case for an active de-dollarisation 
policy is discussed. 
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Residents in developing economies save and borrow in the foreign currency. On average, by the 
end of 2000, 35 percent of domestic bank deposits (and a comparable share of domestic banks 
loans) in developing economies was foreign denominated –44 percent, if we exclude countries 
where dollar deposits are legally banned. So was virtually all their stock of external obligations. 
This phenomenon, generically labelled financial dollarisation (FD), has been increasingly seen 
both in academic and policy circles as a source of concern due to its potentially adverse 
implications for monetary and financial stability, and overall economic performance.
2 The 
purpose of this paper is to evaluate empirically whether and to what extent these concerns are 
validated by the data. 
 
1.1. What  is  it? 
The term dollarisation has been used to denote diverse set of related phenomena. Thus, while 
official (or de jure) dollarisation refers to the case in which the foreign currency is given (usually 
exclusive) legal tender status, unofficial (or de facto) dollarisation is broadly used to indicate the 
use of a foreign currency alongside the national currency when the former is not legal tender. In 
turn, a distinction is usually made between two types of de facto dollarisation: currency 
substitution (the use of the foreign currency as medium of exchange) and asset substitution (its 
use as store of value). This distinction is not merely rhetorical, as currency and asset substitution 
are phenomena of a different nature. In particular, one would expect the nominal peso-dollar 
interest rate differential to affect the currency composition of cash holdings. Thus, high inflation 
(to the extent that it leads to an exchange rate depreciation that is reflected in the interest rate 
differential) should foster currency substitution. By contrast, the composition of interest-bearing 
financial assets (to the extent that interest rates adjust to equalize real returns across currencies) 
should be immune to the inflation level.
3 Indeed, the early empirical tests of dollarisation that 
were based on models of currency composition but, due to the lack of data on foreign currency 
holdings, used dollarisation ratios such as the dollar share of bank deposits or M2, reflected 
primarily the composition of interest-bearing deposit, that is, asset substitution.
4 
                                                 
2 Following what has become standard in the dollarisation literature, dollar and foreign currency, and peso and local 
currency are used here interchangeably. 
3 Thomas (1985) provides an early discussion of this point. 
4 Calvo and Vegh (1992) highlights this definitional problem. Anecdotal evidence (some of which is discussed below) 
indicates that the two phenomena behave quite differently, and that the degree of asset substitution tends to exceed that 
of currency substitution in most cases. Recent efforts to measure actual foreign currency holdings have helped revived 
the empirical literature on currency substitution. See, for example, Feige (2002). FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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Whereas asset substitution focuses on the asset side of the balance sheet, specifically 
asking whether and why residents save in a foreign currency, the more recent literature have 
centred on the concept of liability dollarisation (which, predictably, denotes the dollarisation of 
residents´ liabilities), in line with the view of dollar debt as a source of currency exposure and 
vulnerability to external shocks.
5 Around the same time, the term financial dollarisation (FD) was 
coined to refer more broadly to the holding by the country’s residents of financial assets and 
liabilities denominated in the foreign currency, explicitly acknowledging the fact that observed 
dollarisation reflects both the demand and the supply of dollar assets, and that any analysis of its 
causes and persistence should take into account both sides of the market.
6 This definition, which 
brings together the two strands of the debate on de facto dollarisation, comprises any financial 
asset (domestic and external) denominated in a foreign currency, as long as a resident (private or 
public) is on either side of the contract –including, naturally, official lending to the country. This 
is the phenomenon studied in this paper. 
 
1.2.  Where is it? 
The literature of financial dollarisation has tended to focus on Latin American countries, where 
most of the earlier work on currency substitution was motivated (as a result of a history of high 
inflation), and where the persistence of dollarisation was more readily apparent. However, the 
evidence shows that the phenomenon is far from regional. A cursory look at the distribution of 
economies with deposit dollarisation ratios above 10 percent shows a fairly balanced picture 
(Figure 1).  
  In fact, by 2000, out of the ten countries with the largest deposit dollarisation ratio, one 
could find two from East Asia (Cambodia and Laos), four transition economies, including one 
country in the EMU accession list (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia and Georgia), one from Africa 
(Angola) and only three from Latin America (Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Uruguay). Moreover, even 
in emerging countries such as Malaysia or Thailand where deposit dollarisation is not significant 
due to legal restrictions, there still exists a substantial stock of external dollar liabilities.
7 
Ultimately, as this paper documents in more detail below, FD has proved important and persistent 
in developing countries around the globe. 
 
                                                 
5 See (Calvo, 1999)  for an early reference. 
6 See Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003). 
7 Following standard conventions, by external liability I refer to an obligation issued under international (as opposed to 
domestic) Law. Thus, debt issued under New York Law would be domestic if the issuer is a U.S. resident and external 
otherwise, irrespective of the nationality of the holder. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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1.3.  Why do we care? 
The early literature inspired by currency substitution models tended to regard dollarisation as an 
obstacle for the conduct of monetary policy. Specifically, it argued that dollarised economies 
exhibit a more unstable demand for money and a more elastic price response to monetary shocks, 
as the currency composition of liquid balances becomes more sensitive to devaluation 
expectations. While the argument is more naturally related to currency substitution, monetary 
policy may still be influenced by FD (or, more specifically, by deposit dollarisation) to the extent 
that the composition of deposits impact on the demand for reserves. At any rate, the conventional 
view that dollarisation poses a challenge to monetary policy has not lost ground among policy 
makers (see, e.g., Baliño et al., 1999), and deserves to be revisited in a systematic way. 
More recently, the dollarisation debate has centred on the incidence of balance sheet 
effects. In a nutshell, the concern stems from the fact that widespread FD inevitably introduces a 
currency imbalance for the economy as a whole. This imbalance may affect the banking sector, if 
local banks fund themselves in foreign currency (for example, through dollar deposits or foreign 
borrowing) and on-lend the proceeds domestically in the local currency. More typically, however, 
currency mismatches are present at the borrower’s level, as local banks, constrained by prudential 
limits on their foreign currency position, lend their dollars to borrowers whose income is largely 
denominated in the local currency (or, more precisely, follows closely the evolution of the local 
price index). This currency imbalance creates balance sheet problems in the event of a sharp real 
exchange rate depreciation, as the increase in the local currency value of dollar liabilities 
outpaces the increase in assets –even for the case of currency balanced banks, to the extent that 
their dollar debtors are no longer able to service their loans. A similar argument can be made for 
the sovereign debt: foreign-currency denominated external liabilities increases the vulnerability 
of the country to sizeable depreciations of the local currency. In turn, the resulting exposure to 
real exchange rate changes amplifies the impact of real shocks or speculative attacks on the 
currency, ultimately leading to massive bankruptcies, economic contraction and financial 
collapse.
8  
It was the stream of financial crises in Asia that triggered the interest in the balance sheet 
channel. As Krugman (1999) summarizes the Asian episodes, “descriptive accounts both of the 
problems of the crisis countries and of the policy discussions that led the crisis to be handled in 
the way it was place extensive emphasis on the problems of firms' balance sheets.” This view has 
                                                 
8 Stimulated by the recent episodes of financial distress, the topic of balance sheet effects in dollarized economies have 
spawned a large analytical literature that include, among many others, Krugman (1999), Chang and Velasco (2000),  
Aghion, Banerjee and Bacchetta (2000), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), and Caballero and Krishnamurty 
(2002). FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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only consolidated over time. Currency mismatches certainly played a role in the end-2000 
Turkish banking crisis, where “banks’ net (foreign currency) open positions nearly doubled 
during the first nine months of 2000,” (OECD, 2001), and were key drivers of the currency 
collapses in Brazil (1999), Argentina (2002) and Uruguay (2002). Looking back to the record of 
recent financial crises, Hausmann and Velasco (2004) find that “in Asia and elsewhere, the 
preponderance of dollar debts was very much at the root of this vulnerability to financial panic”. 
In addition to its impact on financial fragility, this balance sheet effect may detract from, 
and ultimately invert the effectiveness of exchange rate adjustments to buffer real shocks.
9 Thus, 
examining the reasons why devaluations have been economically so costly in emerging 
economies, Frankel (2004) concludes that “…on the list of contractionary channels, the balance 
sheet effect is the one that has dominated in terms of attention from researchers, and I think 
appropriately so.” As a result, financially dollarised economies would exhibit greater output 
volatility. Moreover, this real exchange rate exposure may explain the procyclical pattern of 
international capital flows to financially dollarised emerging economies, as negative real shocks 
that tend to depreciate the local currency increase at the same time the leverage ratio of dollar 
debtors, amplifying the effect of the cycle on the debtor’s capacity to pay. 
To what extent this balance sheet effect materializes in reality? To what extent dollarised 
economies are more prone to suffer financial crisis, and exhibit a more volatile and unstable 
growth as the theory envisages? The answer to these questions is still subject to debate. The vast 
body of analytical literature on FD and currency mismatches contrasts with the scarcity of 
empirical work to support or refute its implications.
10 The same can be said, to a lesser extent, of 
the consequences of FD on the conduct of monetary policy. The purpose of this paper is to 
contribute to fill this gap. 
 
1.4.  What does the paper do? 
The paper examines whether the consequences of FD predicted by theory are verified in the data. 
To do that, it proceeds in steps. The next section covers the critical and controversial issue of 
measurement, describes a new updated database on alternative sources of FD (and the still 
important data limitations), and presents basic statistics describing levels, trends and 
geographical distribution. Section 3 presents a summary of the main (often complementary) 
                                                 
9 Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2003) provide a stylized analytical illustration of this point. This, in turn, may lead the 
monetary authorities to limit the flexibility of exchange rates, which may explain the tendency to attenuate exchange 
rate fluctuations through foreign exchange intervention under formally floating exchange rate regimes highlighted by 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002), and the finding that financially dollarized countries tend to adopt more rigid exchange rate 
regimes reported in Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
10 The few exceptions include De Nicoló et al. (2003), Arteta (2002), and Calvo et al. (2003). FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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explanations of FD proposed by the theoretical literature, and reports some (old and new) 
supporting empirical tests. Section 4 tackles the key questions of the paper. After analysing in 
more detail the link between FD, on the one hand, and monetary policy and the balance sheet 
effect of a depreciation of the local currency, on the other, it proposes different empirical tests 
based on the available evidence. The results show that financially dollarised economies tend to 
exhibit a higher price elasticity to monetary shocks (and, partially as a result, higher inflation 
rates), greater propensity to suffer banking crises after exchange rate depreciations, and slower 
and more volatile output growth, with no significant gain in terms of domestic financial depth. In 
this light, Section 5 discusses the case for an active de-dollarisation policy, and concludes. 
 
2. MEASURING  FD 
 
In the context of the FD debate, measurement is certainly a non-trivial aspect for at least two 
reasons. First, the relevant aspect of FD (and, in turn, the way it is measured) is not independent 
of the particular issue under study. For example, any impact that FD may have on monetary 
stability is likely to arise from the link between the (unobserved) currency composition of liquid 
balances, and the composition of residents’ savings (captured, for example, by the deposit 
dollarisation ratio). Similarly, testing the influence of FD on banking crisis propensity would 
require a measure of the dollarisation ratio of the balance sheet of domestic financial institutions.
 
As noted, matching dollar liabilities by lending in dollars to non-dollar earners mitigates the 
balance sheet effect of a real devaluation only to a very minor degree, as the currency exposure is 
simply transfer to the dollar borrower at the expense of greater credit risk. Hence, a focus on the 
gross (rather than the net) short currency position would be appropriate, for which the share the 
onshore deposit dollarisation ratio and the share of foreign bank liabilities would be reasonably 
good proxies. By contrast, the contractionary balance sheet effect of exchange rate depreciations 
on economic performance may also be channelled through the dollarisation of liabilities in the 
non-financial sector. Therefore, a test of the link between FD and output volatility would need to 
consider, in addition, alternative sources of dollar indebtedness (including dollar loans and bonds, 
as well as official lending). 
A second reason why measurement plays an important role is of a more practical nature: 
the choice of a measure is severely constrained by data availability, in terms of both country and 
period coverage. Reliable data is already available on official credit (reported in the World 
Bank’s  Global Development Finance), cross-border loans and, for a more limited sample, FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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external bonded debt (the last two items are reported by the BIS).
11 In addition, a substantial 
amount of information on the currency composition of domestic deposits can be collected from 
different sources. The deposit dollarisation series compiled for this paper assembles data reported 
in various central bank bulletins and International Monetary Fund Article IV Staff Reports, as 
well as previous empirical work by De Nicoló et al. (2003), Arteta (2002), and Baliño et al. 
(1998). As a result, the final series covers over 1524 observations for 122 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1975-2002.
12 In turn, deposit dollarisation ratios can be used 
as a sensible proxy for domestic loan dollarisation, since they often mirror each other due to the 
presence of prudential limits on banks’ foreign exchange positions (Figure 2).  
On the other extreme, reliable information on the currency composition of domestic 
public debt is quite difficult to produce, while data on (both the composition and the level of) 
domestic private debt in developing countries is a rarity.
 13 For this reason, no measure of 
dollarisation of domestic bonded debt is used in the empirical analysis below. 
 
2.1.  FD and the currency mismatch 
The emphasis on gross (domestic and external) dollar liabilities made in this paper explicitly 
takes sides on an issue that is certainly far from settled. In general, a currency mismatch could be 
defined as “the sensitivity of net worth or of the present value of net income to changes in the 
exchange rate” (Goldstein and Turner, 2004), which, for the purpose of measurement, could be 
characterized simply by the net foreign currency position (that is, foreign currency assets minus 
foreign currency liabilities). However, the level at which the netting should be carried out 
(individual households and firms, the government, the financial and non-financial sector, the 
economy as a whole) is far from obvious.  
One strand of the literature on currency mismatches stresses the need to centre on the 
country’s foreign currency indebtedness vis à vis non-residents, in the view that “the assets and 
liabilities of residents cancel out in the aggregate”, with no impact on economic performance 
                                                 
11 While no information on the currency of denomination of cross-border loans is provided by the BIS, it is reasonable 
to assume (as I do here) that they are mostly denominated in the currency of the country where they are originated.  
12 Data reported in those sources were checked for consistency and, in many cases, revised accordingly. The sample 
used here excludes de jure dollarized economies. The data can be downloaded directly from 
http://www.utdt.edu/~ely/papers.html. Table A2 in the Appendix presents a list of countries and periods covered. See 
also Table A1 for a list of variable definitions and sources. 
13 Reinhart et al. (2003) construct a dollarization index based on the dollarization ratios of domestic deposits, external 
debt and domestic public debt. However, as they state in the appendix, available data on the latter covers only 23 
countries for the period 1996-2001, which severely limits the size of the sample. Alternatively, assuming that all 
domestic public debt is denominated in the local currency (as in Claessens et al., 2003) would understate FD, as 
governments in financially dollarized countries such as Argentina, Brazil or Turkey issue substantial amounts of dollar 
(or dollar-linked) debt domestically. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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(Eichengreen et al., 2003). This approach, however, suffers from at least two important 
shortcomings. First, the available data do distinguish between residents and non-residents 
holders, and the implicit association between external debt and non-resident holders typically 
assumed in the measures proposed by this literature is at least debatable. 
More importantly, even if this distinction were feasible, there are reasons to believe that 
the domestic aggregation hypothesis is not verified in practice. Even in the extreme case of a 
financially dollarised economy that holds no foreign asset or liability, there may be still be a 
currency imbalance at the micro level, as resident holders of dollar assets typically differ from 
resident holders of dollar liabilities. If so, at the time of a real exchange rate adjustment, 
individual mismatches, rather than netting out, would lead to massive bankruptcies, as dollar 
debtors are unable to repay their dollar lenders. Note that the same argument also applies to the 
alternative approach proposed by Goldstein and Turner (2004), where they measure the currency 
mismatch as the aggregate net foreign currency position (inclusive of domestic debt).
14 While 
netting makes sense at the level of individual agents (e.g., the public sector), the aggregate net 
position is likely to understate the potential balance sheet problem.
  The case of a dollarised 
banking sector is a clear example. The fact that, in the aggregate, every dollar deposit is matched 
by a dollar loan does not eliminate the currency exposure of dollar indebted firms, and does not 
protect the banking sector from a deposit run in anticipation of a solvency problem.
15 At any rate, 
while gross liabilities overstates the real degree of currency mismatch, I believe that, for the 
purpose of the present study, the bias is still much smaller than that introduced by the aggregation 
of nets. 
 
2.2.  A first glance at the numbers 
Table 1 provides a quick look at the levels and trends of deposit dollarisation. The ratios have 
increased on average during the 90s, going from 20 to 32 percent by the end of the decade, with 
maxima of more than 90 percent (Cambodia and Bolivia). In addition, deposit dollarisation grew 
or remained relatively stable in most developing countries despite a marked decline in inflation 
rates across the board during the last decade. For ease of comparison, the table reports deposit 
dollarisation and inflation data for a consistent set of countries. The dollarisation numbers do not 
differ much from the simple averages, although levels are slightly higher for the transition sub-
                                                 
14 Their measure is also extremely informationally demanding: the authors are able to compile data for only 22 
countries. 
15 In addition, note that aggregating the positions of the public and private sectors would presume that a government 
can resort to the (sometimes substantial) stock of foreign assets held by residents to avoid a sovereign default. 
Moreover, even in those cases in which individual agents are currency balanced ex-ante, it is easy to conceive the case 
in which they file for bankruptcy after diverting their foreign currency assets right before the currency collapse. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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sample. In all cases, the persistence of dollarisation levels contrasts with inflation rates that 
declined sharply to one-digit levels in all cases. 
It has been pointed out that the currency denomination of portfolios usually adjusts only 
partially to temporary changes in the real exchange rate (Baliño et al., 1999). If so, sudden real 
exchange rate appreciations such as those that followed price liberalization in transition 
economies may lead to overstate the early dollarisation levels. However, this does not appear to 
be the case here: the transition sample exhibits a positive trend, particularly steep given that the 
figures correspond to the shorter 1995-2000 period (Figure 3). Figure 4 further illustrates this 
evolution, showing that for 15 out of 21 European transition countries the deposit dollarisation 
ratio increased over the period 1998-2001 (the last three years covered by the data), confirming 
the growing incidence of FD within the region.
16 
Table 2 complements this first pass, illustrating the magnitude of the different sources of 
liability dollarisation assessed in the database, normalized by the country’s GDP as a way of 
capturing the associated exposure. Specifically, the table reports dollar deposits (here used as a 
proxy for onshore dollar loans), official (bilateral and multilateral) loans, cross-border bank 
loans, and external (private and public) bonded debt, for the years 1995 and 2000, based on a 
consistent sample of developing countries for which data on all sources are available for the two 
years, and excludes offshore financial centres where FD is typically large but of a different nature 
that the one studied here. In addition, the table presents averages for the emerging and non-
emerging sub-samples. 
Note that different sources of dollarisation are likely to reflect different underlying 
factors. For example, the rationale for government borrowing in foreign currency and 
dollarisation of onshore bank loans are not necessarily connected. However, they all have in 
common their implications in terms of currency mismatches, and the simple comparison in the 
table is a helpful illustration of their relative importance.  
Indeed, the data reveal a number of interesting facts. First, the large incidence of both 
domestic and external bank loans relative to external bonded debt, somewhat in contrast with the 
emphasis that the literature on currency mismatches typically places on the latter. The same can 
be said of the importance of official debt, by far the main source of liability dollarisation. Second, 
most ratios has been increasing (or, for the case of official lending, stable), indicating that the 
trends identified for deposit dollarisation are not an isolated phenomenon. Third, as expected, 
non-emerging developing countries show a much stronger reliance of official lending (which 
                                                 
16 This is not independent of the surge in euroization induced by the prospect of monetary integration, to which I come 
back below. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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explains the larger overall FD), as opposed to emerging economies where bonded debt (while 
still below other sources) plays a relatively major role. Finally, the ratio of deposit dollarisation 
over GDP yields comparable numbers across the different groups.
17 The table also shows the 
statistics for Latin American and transition sub-samples: although FD has been consistently 
higher for the former, the advance of FD has been much more pronounced for the latter, in line 
with the evolution of deposit dollarisation documented above. Thus, the evidence clearly 
indicates that FD, in its different varieties, has become a pervasive characteristic in the 
developing world. 
 
3. THE  DRIVERS 
 
The literature have provided over the years a number of explanations to account for the high and 
persistent levels of FD in developing economies, reflecting the various angles from which the 
phenomenon has been studied. With a few exceptions, however, the empirical tests of these 
theories have been partial (addressing one aspect but controlling imperfectly for the others) and 
have suffered from limited data availability. Moreover, some of the most recent explanations 
have not been tested at all. 
It is useful then to summarize this body of analytical work from a broader perspective to 
highlight its links and complementarities, and to revisit it in light of the new available data. The 
survey presented in this section does not intend to provide an exhaustive account. Rather, it 
focuses on what I believe are the key hypotheses proposed by the literature, to examine the extent 
to which they are supported by the data.  
 
3.1. The  theories 
As noted, the early literature on dollarisation was primarily interested in the currency substitution 
phenomenon and its influence on the conduct of monetary policy. As a result, the first 
explanations tended to stress the negative connection between the demand for the local currency 
(and its use for transactions purposes), on the one hand, and the rate of inflation (or, alternatively, 
the memory of past inflation episodes), on the other. As such, they are relevant to the theme of 
this paper only to the extent that currency substitution influences the currency composition of 
savings. This influence, however, appears to be weak: anecdotal evidence indicates that the 
phenomenon of currency substitution tends to be relatively minor in those countries that exhibit 
                                                 
17 Emerging economies are defined as those included in J. P. Morgan’s EMBI Global portfolio. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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Box 1. The currency substitution view 
 
Dollarisation was interpreted by the early literature as a currency substitution phenomenon. 
Standard models of CS would predict that ratio between local and foreign currency nominal 
balances, c, to be a function of the nominal interest rates in each currency, so that c = f (i, i
*), with  
f´1 < 0, f´2 > 0,  where i, i
* are the peso and dollar interest rates, respectively. In turn, assuming 
interest rate parity, i = i
* + E(∆e) (where E(∆e) denotes the expected rate of devaluation), c = f (i
*, 
E(∆e)). Thus, to the extent that inflation is ultimately reflected in the nominal exchange rate, 
expected inflation should foster CS. 
This view was challenged by the persistence of dollarisation in the 90s, at a time when 
inflation rates in dollarised countries declined markedly. This persistence has been attributed by 
the CS view to long-lasting memories of past inflation that induce high inflation expectations 
even after years of price stability (Savastano, 1996). Alternatively, it has been viewed as the 
consequence of the fixed cost of switching to the dollar as a conventional medium of payment. 
More precisely, if a long period of inflation and depreciation is needed to justify the switch to the 
dollar, once this is done, a similarly long period of appreciation is needed to revert the process 
(Guidotti and Rodríguez, 1992). Again, this hypothesis would imply that dollarisation is a 
response to past rather than current inflation. 
 
 
More recently, inspired by the renewed interest in FD, the literature has produced a 
number of analytical models that are more directly linked to the view of dollarisation as an asset 
substitution phenomenon. For the purposes of this survey, these models can be broadly classified 
in three groups: i) a portfolio view that explains FD as the optimal portfolio choice for a given 
distribution of real returns in each currency; ii) a market failure view that explains FD as the 
suboptimal response to a market imperfection; and iii) an institutional view that emphasizes how 
institutional failures can foster FD, either by introducing new distortions or by reinforcing the 
channels discussed in the previous two groups.  
 
                                                 
18 Typical exceptions are big-ticket items (e.g., real estate). On this, see Ize and Parrado (2002). FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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3.2.  The portfolio view  
Ize and Levy Yeyati’s (2003) portfolio approach starts from the assumption that risk-averse 
resident investors choose their asset portfolio to optimise the risk/return profile in terms of the 
local consumption basket. Thus, while the real return on peso assets is affected by changes in the 
inflation rate, the real return on dollar assets is influenced by unexpected changes in the real 
exchange rate. Then, in the absence of real interest rate differentials across currencies, the 
investor chooses the currency composition of savings so as to minimize the variance of portfolio 
returns, which is shown to depend on the volatility of the inflation and the real depreciation rates. 
If so, it can be shown that the dollarisation ratio is directly proportional to the coefficient of 
exchange rate pass-through.  
 
Box 2. Deriving the portfolio model  
 
Assume that the investment menu of risk-averse resident investors comprises two options: dollar 
and peso interest-bearing bank deposits, with real returns equal to rp = E(rp ) – µπ – µs, and rd = 
E(rd )– µs, respectively, where µπ  and µs are zero-mean disturbances to the local inflation and real 
devaluation rates, and  ()
j Er  denotes the expected real return on the assets. Assume further that 
investors maximize the following utility function: 
maxxj  U = E(r) – Var(r) / 2  
with xj ≥ 0, j = p, d, denote the peso and dollar shares, respectively, and r = Σj xj rj the real return 
on the portfolio. 
Then, it can be shown that, if the uncovered interest rate parity condition holds, the dollar 
share of the optimal investment portfolio (which replicates the minimum variance portfolio) is 
equal to 
mvp ≡ (var(π) + cov(π,s)) / (var(π) + var(s) + 2cov(π,s)). 
Moreover, replacing µs ≈ µe - µπ , where e denotes the nominal rate of devaluation, the deposit 
dollarisation ration simplifies to mvp=var(π)/cov(π,e), the coefficient of a simple regression of 
the inflation rate on the nominal exchange rate, that is, a crude measure of the exchange rate pass 
through. 
 
The intuition is clear if we consider the extreme case of perfect pass-through, in which 
inflation and nominal exchange rate changes cancel out to leave the real exchange rate constant. 
In this economy, the real value of dollar assets would be fixed in real terms, and the minimum FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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variance portfolio would be fully dollarised. More generally, as the variability of inflation 
increases relative to that of the real devaluation rate, peso assets become more risky and less 
attractive. 
A number of implications can be derived from this model. First, exchange rate regimes 
matter only in combination with monetary policy. From the previous analysis, it follows that a 
mix of flexible exchange rates and inflation targeting minimizes dollarisation incentives. By 
contrast, floating exchange rates in a context of high and volatile inflation may have the opposite 
effect.
19 Second, more open countries are likely to display higher dollarisation ratios, to the extent 
that a larger import component is reflected in a higher pass-through. Third, residents and non-
residents choose their portfolios differently: peso instruments look relatively more attractive to 
local savers (borrowers) than to foreigners, because they mirror more closely their stream of 
future consumption (income). As a result, the optimal dollarisation ratio is lower for the resident 
investor.
20 For the same reason, from the standpoint of the resident investor, real assets (such as 
CPI-indexed deposits) should generally dominate dollar assets, as they minimize (and, if 
perfectly indexed, fully eliminate) the variability of real returns.
21 
 
3.3.  The market failure view  
A second group of explanations point to a dollarisation bias related with the presence of market 
imperfection and externalities –and an inadequate regulatory framework that fails to address 
them.  
  The dollarisation bias in Broda and Levy Yeyati (forthcoming) arises from the 
combination of two ingredients: a positive correlation between the probability of default and the 
real exchange rate, and imperfect information on the currency composition of the borrower. As 
the authors show that, if interest rates cannot be made contingent on the currency composition of 
the borrower’s liabilities, and if the scrap value of a failed debtor is distributed among creditors 
on a pro rata basis, the borrower finds dollar funding relatively cheaper, and dollarises. The 
                                                 
19 The case of pegged regimes (when the peg currency is the one used for financial assets) is ambiguous. If the peg is 
fully credible, the problem becomes indeterminate, as the two currencies are identical and the issue of denomination no 
longer plays a role. If the peg is not fully credible (if there is a positive probability of an exchage rate realignment), the 
dollarization ratio would be determined by the expected pass-through at the time of the realignment, irrespective of the 
probability of a regime change (Ize and Parrado, 2002). 
20 This point, originally made by Thomas (1985) and discussed in more detail in Levy Yeyati (2004), may help explain 
why dollarization ratios are particularly high in international markets. This resident-nonresident distinction is in line 
with the evidence that past debt de-dollarization processes have been driven by a deepening of the domestic markets 
(Bordo et al., 2002), and that the dollarization ratio of government bonds is negatively related with the size of domestic 
financial markets (Claessens et al., 2003, Eichengreen et al., 2003). 
21 Note that the same is true for the borrower to the extent that the CPI is closely correlated with the price of the firm’s 
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reason is simple. Since dollar lenders fare better in default states when the exchange rate is 
higher, interest rate arbitrage requires that peso lenders fare better in non-default states. But a 
limited liability borrower only pays in the non-default states when peso lenders are expected to 
receive more. Hence, the lower effective cost of (and the preference for) the dollar. 
  A similar argument can be applied for the case of a uniform creditor guarantee: to the 
extent that it increases the recovery value of a failed investment, it enhances the benefits of the 
dollar in default states, increasing the peso premium in non-default states.
22 The case of full 
deposit insurance is a good illustration. Since dollar (but not peso) depositors are provided 
protection against exchange rate risk in default states at the expense of the deposit insurance 
agency, the value of deposit insurance is higher for dollar lenders. It follows that any insurance 
scheme that fails to incorporate in the premium this difference in value would favour dollar 
intermediation. 
  Jeanne (2000) highlights how a peso problem (namely, a large peso interest rate premium 
due to devaluation expectations) can give rise to dollarisation in the presence of another market 
imperfection: non-linear liquidation costs. In this case, the currency composition is optimally 
chosen to minimize the probability of default and avoid facing liquidation costs. Thus, if the 
devaluation threat is unlikely, the borrower may opt for the cheaper dollar. A non-credible peg 
provides a natural example: individuals assign a small probability to a change in the exchange 
rate but, if the change materializes, they expect the local currency to collapse. This small 
probability of a large devaluation may widen the peso-dollar spread to a point at which the 
default risk of a peso borrower indebted at a high interest rate exceeds the risk of a dollar 
borrower that faces a sure death only in the unlikely devaluation scenario. In this context, the 
borrower would prefer to take his chances with the foreign currency. The argument, however, can 
be readily extended to the case of a flexible exchange rate regime, inasmuch as the distribution of 
exchange rate changes is sufficiently skewed. 
  A third group of explanations attribute the dollarisation bias to the presence of 
externalities that generate the perception of implicit debtor guarantees (Burnside et al., 2001). 
The social cost of massive bankruptcies following a sharp devaluation makes a debtor bailout ex-
post optimal for the government. In turn, borrowers anticipate this bailout and price currency risk 
accordingly. Much in the same way as in the case of deposit insurance, a debtor guarantee is 
more valuable for dollar debtors (because it pays when dollar debts are more costly) and 
introduces a dollar advantage. The implicit debtor guarantee argument highlights the time 
                                                 
22 Conversely, the dollar advantage (and the dollarization bias) disappear if the recovery value is zero. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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inconsistency of the government’s promise to limit its involvement in the resolution of a financial 
crisis with widespread negative externalities.
23 
 
Box 3. The market failure view 
 
The dollarisation bias discussed in Broda and Levy Yeyati (forthcoming) can be illustrated by 
means of a simple example. A limited-liability borrower invests in a project with a gross return 
pR (where p denotes the domestic price index) financed entirely by risk-neutral lenders. The end-




l) < 1 < p(e
l) < e
h, and Prob(e = e
l ) 
= q, where the current rate is normalized to 1.  
Key to the argument is the assumption that the probability of default is higher in times of 
high real exchange rates. For simplicity, assume here that the borrower defaults if and only if 
there is a devaluation, in which case the residual value of the defaulter, (1-θ) p(e
l)R, is distributed 
on a pro rata basis among creditors, who recover a fraction δ(λ) = (1-θ)p(e
l)R / [(1-λ) rp + λ e
hrd ] 
of their claims (where θ denotes the liquidation cost, λ is the dollar share of the debtor’s 
liabilities, and rp and rd are the peso and dollar interest rates).  
It follows that the interest rates in each currency have to satisfy the arbitrage condition 
rp[q+ (1-q)δ] = rd[qe
l + (1-q) δe
h], from which, rearranging, we obtain  
s ≡ (rp –e
l rd) = e
l (1-q)δ( e
h - e
l )/[q + (1-q)δ] > 0. 
where s represents the additional return demanded by peso lenders to compensate for the lower 
return on peso assets in the event of a devaluation cum default. 
  In turn, if the currency composition of liabilities is not observed by the lender, the 
borrower’s problem can be expressed (in real terms) as: 
maxλ π = [q/ p(e
l)] [p(e
l)R – (1-λ) rp – λ e
l rd] 
from which π´ = [q/ p(e
l)] s > 0. Hence, the borrower chooses to borrow in dollars (λ = 1). 
Intuitively, while dollar lenders benefit at the expense of peso lenders in the event of default, the 
peso premium in non-default states is effectively paid to peso lenders by the borrower, who 
therefore finds dollar rates relatively more attractive. 
Note that the dollar advantage increases with the effective recovery ratio. Thus, a 
(currency-blind) creditors´ guarantee, to the extent that it raises this ratio, fosters dollarisation. 
                                                 
23 The argument goes beyond the case of bailouts: any implicit debtor insurance, to the extent that defaults are 
correlated with the real exchange rate, would favor dollarization. For example, the accumulation of international 
reserves may fuel the dollarization of the banking sector, if they are perceived by commercial banks as increasing the 
probability that the central bank provides dollar liquidity in the event of a dollar shortage (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 
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For example, deposit insurance strengthens the dollarisation bias whenever its coverage δI > δ. 
Similarly, the fact that the recovery ratio depends negatively on the liquidation cost θ indicates 
that the dollarisation bias is proportional to the protection of creditors rights. The result has been 
used by De la Torre and Schmukler (2003) to argue that the bias should be stronger for emerging 
markets´  external debt, to the extent that international markets are less burdened by long 
bankruptcy procedures, confiscation risk, corruptible judges and other factors eroding the value 
of the creditors´ claim. 
The previous example can be adapted to illustrate how a peso problem may introduce a 
financial dollarisation bias in the presence of liquidation costs, according to Jeanne’s (2002) 
argument.  
First, note is that rp increases with the expected post-devaluation exchange rate, e
h. Then, 
if investors expect a currency collapse, the peso interest rate may pushed so high as to make peso 
funding financially unviable if the devaluation does not materialize, that is, p(e
l)R < rp < p(e
h)R. 
In this case, while dollar debtors still default in the event of a devaluation, peso debtors need the 
devaluation to avoid default (as the resulting inflation dilutes their peso liabilities). 
Next, assume for simplicity that borrowers can choose between pesos and dollars but not 
a combination of both (and that this choice is observed). Therefore, at the time of choosing 
between currencies, the debtor compares the expected real returns associated with dollar and peso 
funding:   
πλ=1 = [q/ p(e
l)] [p(e
l)R – e
l rd] >< [(1-q)/ p(e
h)] [p(e
h)R – e
h rp] = πλ=0 
which, using the interest rate arbitrage conditions, yields: 
πλ=1 = R –(1-q)θR – rf e
m/ p(e
l) >< R –qθR – rf e
m/ p(e
h) = πλ=0 
Then, if agents assign a small probability q to a very large devaluation (a non-credible 
peg is a natural example), borrowers prefer to risk bankruptcy due to a currency mismatch rather 
than the more likely insolvency due to the lofty peso rates that incorporate the expectations of a 
currency collapse (as in the so-called “peso problem”). 
It is immediate to see how a debtors´ guarantee that reduces (or eliminates) the 
probability of default contingent on a large devaluation tilts the balance of the previous tradeoff 
in favor of dollar funding. Imagine that, in the event of a currency debacle, debtors expect to be 
bailed out with probability β. Then, it follows that πB, λ=1 = R –β(1-q)θR – r f e
m/ p(e
l), which 
increases with β. 
 




3.4.  The institutional view 
There are a number of ways in which the quality of institutions may introduce or enhance the 
dollarisation drivers previously discussed. For the example, to the extent that weak institutions 
detract from the credibility of a commitment not to bail out dollar debtors in the event of a 
sudden devaluation, they may compound the mispricing associated with implicit government 
guarantees (De Nicoló et al., 2003). 
  On the other hand, currency-blind policies fostering dollarisation may be the result of a 
deliberate policy choice. As De la Torre et al.’s (2003) stress for the case of a Argentinean peg, 
discriminating across currencies, while appropriate for a prudential perspective, would have been 
at odds with a government’s quest to build confidence on the exchange rate anchor. Inverting the 
argument, the dollar-friendly regulation could be interpreted as a commitment mechanism (as the 
government borrowed credibility by making the costs of a devaluation prohibitively high) or, 
following De la Torre et al. (2003), as “a high-stakes strategy to overcome a weak currency 
problem.”
24 In either case, dollarisation could be viewed seen as the collateral cost of low 
institutional credibility. 
  A related explanation points at the temptation of a peso-indebted government to inflate 
away the real burden of the debt (Calvo and Guidotti, 1990). If the government has no way to 
commit to low inflation (if its inflation credentials are poor), expectations that anticipate this 
behaviour lead to high peso interest rates and the familiar inflation bias that, to the extent that the 
government cares about inflation, would dissuade it from issuing peso debt. In this case, public 
debt dollarisation could be interpreted as a deliberate decision by the issuer to avert the inflation 
bias.
25 The argument can be framed as a multiple-equilibrium story in which the equilibrium is 
determined by the government’s credibility. If the repudiation-by-inflation decision hinges on the 
trade-off between the cost of repudiation and the cost of servicing the debt, a poor institutional 
track record (associated with high repudiation expectations and high interest rates) would be self-
fulfilling as it increases to debt burden and tilts the balance in favour of repudiation. If so, the 
government may choose to dollarise its obligations as a (costly) way to commit to low inflation. 
                                                 
24 Rajan (2004) argues that institutions may also influence FD works through their effect on inflation, as countries with 
poor institutions tend to rely more strongly on the inflation tax during economic downturns. 
25 Note, however, that the model refers to price indexation, which under their assumption of purchasing power parity is 
indistinguishable from dollar-indexation. In a more general context, however, CPI indexation should dominate dollar 
indexation as it eliminates the incentive to monetise while avoiding the undesired real exchange rate exposure. Note 
also that the model concentrates on the denomination of sovereign debt, and in principle cannot be extended to dollar 
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Conversely, a good institutional record would be associated with low repudiation expectations, 
low interest rates, and no inflation bias.  
 
3.5.  The drivers in the data 
To what degree are observed dollarisation ratios explained by these theories? A preliminary 
assessment of the relative importance of some of the drivers listed above is reported by De 
Nicoló et al. (2003), who find support for the portfolio and institutional view. Here, I briefly 
revisit and extend these results by regressing the deposit dollarisation ratio on a set of basic 
controls intended to capture the main drivers. 
  Some of the candidate variables are natural choices. For example, the average past 
inflation (∆p_avg) can be used to capture the currency substitution view.
26 Similarly, the dollar 
share of the minimum variance portfolio (mvp) can be readily computed from historical inflation 
and real depreciation rates (see Box 2) to test the portfolio model. A key factor highlighted by the 
market failure view, namely, the positive correlation between the probability of default and the 
real exchange rate, is partially proxied by the correlation between real GDP growth and real 
exchange rate changes (rer_cyc): the more procyclical the real exchange rate, the stronger the 
dollarisation bias. I include the initial GDP per capita (gdppc_i), which captures both economic 
and institutional factors that may influence the development of local currency markets.
27 Finally, 
I add a variable that measures the degree of legal restrictions on onshore dollarisation 
(restrictions) revised and extended from the index compiled by De Nicoló et al. (2003) based on 
the International Monetary Fund’s AREAER.
28 
  Institutional variables are more elusive. Most of the standard indicators of institutional 
quality are broadly defined, and available only for recent years. Of them, I use a composite index 
(composite) that averages six governance indicators compiled by Kaufmann et al. (1999), where 
large values indicate greater institutional development, with the caveat that the indicators are 
computed only since 1996. Alternatively, I use the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
                                                 
26 The average inflation rate is measured in levels instead of logs to avoid missing the negative inflation years, which 
would bias the sample towards high inflation countries. The average depreciation rate (highly correlated with avergae 
inflation as expected) yielded similar results as those reported below. 
27 Since, as noted, economic size may also influence the development of local currency financial assets, the country’s 
GDP was also tested but failed to be significant. These results (as well as all others that are mentioned in the text but 
omitted from the tables) are available upon request. 
28 While the index of restrictions corresponds to the year 2000, we can reasonably assume that the degree of 
restrictiveness in individual countries is relatively constant over time. Indeed, the index exhibits a high and statistically 
significant correlation with annual dollarization ratios in different years. For a description of how the index is 
constructed, see De Nicoló et al. (2003). FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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(cpia) assembled by the World Bank, which covers a longer period but only for developing 
economies.
29  
  Exchange rate pegs (or, more generally, exchange rate anchors) are also highlighted by 
the institutional view as possible drivers of FD.
30 To test this hypothesis, I construct a peg 
dummy, equal to one whenever the exchange rate regime is classified as a fix, using both the de 
jure regime classification compiled by Ghosh et al. (2003), and the de facto classification 
prepared by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (forthcoming). Whereas the former reproduces the 
official assessment of the regime periodically reported by the country’s authorities to the 
International Monetary Fund, the latter groups regimes based on actual changes in exchange rate 
and international reserves. Both classifications tend to differ substantially, reflecting deviations 
of actual exchange rate policies from announced ones. Note that, while both approaches are used 
in the tests below, for the purposes of this section de jure regimes would seem to capture more 
closely the explicit exchange rate commitment that may inhibit a discrimination across currencies 
or fuel the perception of implicit exchange rate guarantees.
31  
  Table 3 presents the results. The first half of the table report regressions of the average 
dollarisation ratios over the 1990-2001 period on averages of the controls over the same period, 
while the second half focuses on dollarisation ratios as of end-1999 based on past values of the 
controls. Results are comparable in both cases.
32  
As can be seen, the link between deposit dollarisation ratios and past inflation (column 1) 
weakens once mvp is included (column 2), and ceases to be significant when initial per capital 
income is added (column 3). On the other hand, the coefficients for this last two variables, as well 
as that for the restrictions index, are significant and of the expected sign.
33 Results are basically 
unaltered when I add the measure of the procyclicality of the real exchange rate, rer_cyc, which 
exhibits a significant and negative coefficient, as expected. It may be argued that existing 
                                                 
29 Governance indicators are available for years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. The CPIA index is composed of 20 
different components covering macroeconomic and sectoral policies, as well as issues such as the rule of law and 
corruption, each rated ordinally by country specialists on a scale of 1-6, using standardized criteria. It is available for 
the period 1977-1999, and covers 133 in the latest year.  
30 In addition, to the extent that under a peg the real exchange rate adjust only partially to external shocks, pegs (and 
other rigid exchange rate arrangements) may be conducive to the build-up of a peso problem. 
31 Other factors are more difficult to identify empirically. For example, a peso problem depends on unobserved 
expectations and, even under the assumption that uncovered interest rate parity holds, data on peso-dollar domestic 
interest rate differential are available for very few countries. On the other hand, any computation of the real exchange 
rate misalignment would require a controversial estimation of equilibrium exchange rates. The same is valid for the 
role of creditor and debtor guarantees highlighted by the market failure view, which in most situations tend to be 
implicit and thus unobservable in the data. 
32 The data for all the empirical tests in the paper are annual. 
33 Not surprisingly, the average deposit dollarization level falls from roughly 30% in unrestricted countries to 10% in 
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explanations apply less naturally when portfolio choices are restricted by law, as in this case FD 
may materialize through a flight to foreign dollar-denominated assets not captured by the deposit 
dollarisation ratio. However, results do not differ when I restrict attention to countries without 
dollarisation restrictions (column 5).  
A number of reasons suggest that the previous findings should be interpreted as 
indicative of an association rather than a proof of causality. For example, FD may lead to higher 
exchange rate pass-through coefficients (of which mvp as a crude approximation) or may increase 
the impact of real exchange rate changes on economic activity (strengthening the procyclicality 
of exchange rates).
34 To partially mitigate these endogeneity concerns, I rerun the specification in 
column 4 using the dollarisation ratio by end-1999 (column 6): the results are virtually identical.  
I use this specification to test the two institutional indicators and the peg dummies (all 
included lagged). Both composite and cpia (the latter for the smaller developing country sample) 
appear with a positive but not significant coefficient (columns 7 and 8). Note, however, that per 
capita income is no longer significant either, possibly due to its very high sample correlation with 
the two institutional indexes (of 0.88 and 0.57, respectively). Indeed, when the per capita income 
is excluded, the coefficients of both composite and cpia are larger and significant (columns 9 and 
10). Thus, these (highly collinear) controls may be interpreted as alternative indicators of 
institutional quality. However, these findings should be taken with caution, as the high 
correlation may also reflect the impact of economic performance on institutional quality as 
perceived by the country’s residents.
35 Finally, the coefficients for the de jure peg dummy have 
the wrong (negative) sign and fail to be significant (column 11).
36 
In sum, the tests confirm previous empirical findings: they provide support to the 
portfolio view and are broadly consistent with the view that poor institutional quality fosters FD. 
In addition, they contribute some preliminary backing for the market failure view by showing 
that dollarisation is significantly higher in countries where the procyclicality of the real exchange 
rate is stronger. On the other hand, the data fail to reveal a link between exchange rate regimes 
and FD. More generally, while the limited time spanned by the sample should caution against 
                                                 
34 I come back to these issues in the next section.  
35 The interrelation of institutions and growth has already been noted in the literature (see, e.g., Chong and Calderón, 
2000). In addition, governance indicators (largely based on resident polls), may be influenced by economic 
performance if residents’ perceptions of institutional quality are affected by economic downturns or crisis episodes that 
put institutions to test and make their limitations more visible. The use of the cpia index, to the extent that it is prepared 
by external observers atenuates in part these concerns. 
36 Note that this is not due to a correlation between the peg dummy and mvp: the correlation between the two is only 
0.0747, and not significant. The use of a de facto peg dummy based on the classification of Levy Yeyat and 
Sturzenegger yield a similar results. Also in line with the institutional view, I tested for the incidence of the inflation 
bias by including the central government balance over GDP, both alone and interacted with the institutional indicators, 
under the hypothesis that fiscally stressed governments face a larger temptation to inflate, and that the associated peso 
premium is compounded by low this institutional credibility. No statistically significant links were found in this case. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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interpreting the results as indication of causality, the evidence show that a large share of cross-
country differences in FD can be attributed to the some of the economic and institutional factors 
highlighted in the literature. 
 
4. THE  CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
4.1.  Dollarisation and monetary policy 
The earlier literature stressed the fact that dollarisation, by reducing the costs of switching to the 
foreign currency to avoid the effects of inflation, may increase the volatility of money demand, 
impinging on the capacity of the central bank to conduct monetary policy. While this concern 
was rooted in the view of dollarisation as a currency substitution phenomenon, a similar 
argument could be made regarding the dollarisation of domestic savings. Specifically, as the 
flight to readily available foreign-currency assets becomes less costly, the demand for reserve 
money in a dollarised economy should be more sensitive to a monetary expansion or a to change 
in the exchange rate. 
  A cursory look at the data confirms this view: the inflation response of monetary shocks 
is indeed stronger in dollarised economies. To illustrate the point, Figure 5 plots the elasticity of 
the inflation rate with respect to changes in broad money, on the average deposit dollarisation 
ratio.37 As can be seen, the elasticity increases significantly as FD deepens. 
  To explore this hypothesis further, I use a simple specification based on the log 
linearisation of a standard money demand equation, to which I add the change in the nominal 
peso-dollar exchange rate, the deposit dollarisation ratio, and the interaction of the latter with the 
changes in broad money, to get:  
 
∆pit = α1∆m2it + α2∆gdpit + α3∆intrateit + α4∆erit + α5dollarit  
+ α6∆m2it*dollari + τt + ψi + ξit 
 
                                                 
37 The elasticity is estimated as the coefficent of a simple (country-by-country) regression of the inflation rate on broad 
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where ∆p, ∆m2 and ∆gdp are the log changes of the consumer price index, broad money and real 
output, ∆intrate is the change in the nominal interest rate, dollar is the deposit dollarisation ratio, 
and τ and ψ are year and country fixed effects –which capture, respectively, the worldwide 
decline in inflation rates, and country-specific factors, such as institutional quality, that may 
influence both inflation and FD.
38 The onshore deposit dollarisation ratio is our best estimate of 
the currency composition of the demand for money and thus the appropriate measure of FD to 
study these issues.
39 
  Note that this reduced-form specification is not intended to examine the elasticity of the 
inflation rate with respect to the money supply (captured by the coefficient α1), but rather to 
assess whether and to what extent FD affects it. More precisely, the hypothesis to be tested (FD 
increases the sensitivity of inflation to a monetary expansion) would imply that α6 > 0. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 confirm this prior, indicating that dollarisation is associated 
with a greater sensitivity of inflation to changes in the monetary aggregate. The first column 
presents the baseline specification.
40 The coefficients display the correct sign (positive for money 
growth, exchange rate changes and interest rates, negative for output growth). Column (2) 
includes the interaction of the average dollarisation ratio with the money growth rate 
(∆m2_dollar_avg). The coefficient is large, has the expected positive sign (indicating that more 
dollarisation raises the elasticity of inflation) and is statistically significant. The same results are 
obtained when I replicate the previous regressions using the current dollarisation ratio (dollar) 
instead of its average (column 3).   
The implications of this greater elasticity for the long-run inflation rate are not 
straightforward. The empirical observation that dollarised economies are characterised by 
significantly larger inflation rates (the correlation between the average deposit dollarisation and 
inflation rates is a highly significant 0.50) cannot be taken as an indication that monetary policy 
is less effective under FD, since it is possibly capturing the inverse direction of causality (that is, 
the one that goes from a high and unstable inflation to FD) or, alternatively, the fact that an 
expansionary monetary policy leads to both high inflation and financial dollarisation. Moreover, 
a sharper price response to changes in the monetary aggregate does not limit per se the scope for 
monetary policy. On the contrary, it suggests that a reduction in the rate of money growth would 
                                                 
38 Tests of several additional variables (openness, government consumption, the exchange rate regime) yielded similar 
results as those reported here at the cost of a loss of observations, and are therefore omitted for brevity. 
39 By contrast, the connection between money demand and other sources of FD is, ex ante, ambiguous. 
40 Here, as well as in all other tests using annual data, standard errors rteported in the tables are robust to clustered 
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have a stronger stabilizing effect. The fact that in most developing economies a steady decline in 
inflation materialized despite high and persistent FD seems to support this possibility.  
What can we say, then, about the impact of FD on inflation? The last three columns of 
Table 4 address this question. Column 4 shows the result of a cross-section regression of average 
inflation on the average GDP, the average dollarisation ratio, plus three regional dummies 
(denoting Latin American, Sub Saharan African and transition economies) and the composite 
governance index to control for institutional quality. As can be seen, dollarised economies 
display higher inflation rates on average.   
However, a positive association between dollarisation and inflation can go in both 
directions, as a high and unstable inflation can foster deposit dollarisation. To dispel concerns 
that the result is reflecting the reverse causality, in column I instrument dollarisation using the 
index of restrictions to onshore dollarisation (restrictions), which is highly correlated with 
deposit dollarisation for each of the years covered by the sample but uncorrelated with the 
inflation rate once FD is controlled for (as column 4 shows). The instrumental variable estimation 
shows a positive and significant (indeed stronger) association between dollarisation and inflation. 
More importantly, When the average money growth rate (∆m2_avg) is introduced in the next 
column, the FD coefficient, while smaller, is still positive and significant. Thus, while the 
correlation between FD and inflation is largely explained by the fact that money growth rates 
happen to be larger in dollarised economies (the sample correlation between the average money 
growth and deposit dollarisation is 0.47 and highly significant), financially dollarised economies 
do exhibit higher inflation rates independently of the path followed by the monetary aggregates. 
 
4.2.  Dollarisation and financial fragility 
Perhaps the concern most frequently emphasized in relation to FD is its deleterious impact on the 
vulnerability to default in the financial sector (financial fragility).  
  Recent work has reported some supporting evidence. De Nicoló et al. (2003) find that 
dollarised banking sectors are characterized by higher insolvency risk (as measured by the Z-
index, a proxy of the probability of default)
41 and higher deposit volatility (a result that is in line 
with the greater volatility of broad money reported in the previous section). Calvo et al. (2003), 
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in related work, document that the propensity of emerging economies to suffer “sudden stops” in 
capital inflows (that is, sharp capital account reversals) increases with the degree of FD, which 
they measure as the sum of dollar deposits and foreign liabilities in the domestic banking sector, 
computed as a share of GDP. 
Closer to the focus of this paper, Domac and Martínez Pería (forthcoming) find that ratio 
of foreign liabilities to assets of local banks is positively correlated with the probability of facing 
a systemic banking crisis. This is at odds, however, with Arteta (2003), who fails to find, albeit 
for a smaller sample, a significant link between onshore deposit dollarisation and the probability 
of a banking crisis. Thus, it appears that the incidence of FD on financial fragility and crisis 
propensity due to the presence of balance sheet effects –certainly one the main themes of the FD 
debate–still needs to be validated by the evidence. 
In this section I revisit this issue. I model the probability of a banking crisis as a function 
of the change in the nominal exchange rate (∆er), and two measures of FD: a deposit 
dollarisation dummy (dollar_10) that equals 1 whenever the deposit dollarisation ratio for the 
previous year exceeds 10%, and the ratio between local banks´ foreign currency liabilities and 
assets (FL/FA), which captures non-deposit liability dollarisation in the domestic banking system. 
In turn, the crisis event is captured by a dummy (crisis) that equals one for the first period of the 
crisis, and zero in non-crisis periods. Crises would typically have a strong influence on both the 
exchange rate and the degree of dollarisation. To mitigate this potential endogeneity problem, I 
drop from the sample all crisis observations following the first crisis year, and lag all control 
variables. Note that, through the balance sheet channel, FD should increase the propensity of a 
crisis for any given exchange rate change –indeed, in a non-dollarised economy, there is a priori 
no reason to expect that a devaluation should have a negative impact on the stability of the 
banking sector. Then, it follows that a test of the presence of balance sheet effects should focus 
on the interaction between the exchange rate change and each of the FD measures: a positive 
coefficient of these interactions would be supportive of the balance sheet hypothesis. 
The tests are reported in Table 5. The first regression includes as controls only the 
devaluation rate and the two FD proxies, and yields the expected results: both devaluations and 
FD increase crisis propensity. In column 2, I add the interaction terms. As can be seen, while 
both interactions are positive and significant, the coefficient of the exchange rate change ceases 
to be significant.
42 Similarly, the total effect of both FD variables is positive and significant, at 
                                                 
42 In fact, it turns negative, suggesting that banking sectors in non-dollarized economies actually may benefit from an 
exchange rate adjustment, possibly due to its positive impact on the real economy. Unfortunately, the coefficients are 
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the expense of that of the exchange rate change. Thus, not only does the incidence of exchange 
rate changes in crisis propensity increase with FD; exchange rate shocks have a negative impact 
on financial stability only in the presence of FD. 
This result is strikingly robust to the inclusion of additional controls. Column 3 adds a 
number of (lagged) standard crisis determinants: the inflation rate, changes in the terms of trade 
(∆tt), the real interest rate (realint), the real GDP growth rate, and the ratios of M2 to 
international reserves, private credit to GDP, liquid assets to total bank assets, and capital flows 
to GDP. Column 4 controls for institutional factors (under the hypothesis that poor institutional 
quality increases the incidence of banking crises), adding the composite index and the real GDP 
per capita as broad controls for institutional quality. Finally, columns 5 controls for capital 
account reversals (“sudden stops”) in the previous year. The additional variables tend to display 
the expected sign, although only a few are statistically significant at conventional levels, possibly 
due to multicollinearity problems. More importantly, the coefficients of the variables of interest 
remain significant and of comparable value despite the substantial loss of observations. 
This point is further illustrated in Figure 6. For the first panel, I use the model of column 
2 to compute the probability of a banking crisis as a function of the change in the exchange rate, 
for low and high deposit dollarisation ratios (highdoll equal to zero and one, respectively), 
keeping FL/FA constant and equal to its mean. In the second panel, I do the same setting FL/FA 
at its minimum and maximum values, and keeping deposit dollarisation at its mean. Two things 
are apparent from this exercise: i) exchange rate changes have visible effect on crises propensity 
in the presence of FD: in both cases, the steep positive slope of the high dollarisation curve 
contrasts with the flat slope for non-dollarised economies; ii) the economic effect appears to be 
sizable: the probability of a banking crisis after a 100 percent devaluation increases by about 15 
percent when we go from zero to full deposit dollarisation, and by 8% when foreign liabilities of 
domestic banks go from zero to 16 times foreign assets. 
The previous results substantiate the concern linking FD with financial fragility through 
the balance sheet channel. Dollarisation advocates, however, has often stressed that this undesired 
consequence should be weighted against the beneficial effects of onshore dollarisation on local 
intermediation, in countries where financial markets would otherwise be insufficiently developed 
due to a weak currency problem. A final answer to the question about whether FD helps develop 
domestic markets in weak currency economies remains elusive, as empirical testing is 
undermined by the scarcity of data and the difficulty to control for all relevant factors that may 
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However, a recent study by De Nicoló et al. (2003) provides some valuable preliminary 
insights. By regressing financial depth (measured as the M2 to GDP ratio) on the deposit 
dollarisation ratio plus a number of additional controls, they find that dollarisation is not 
associated per se with deeper markets, except in high inflation countries where it appears to have 
a countervailing effect.
43 
A cursory look at the data further illustrates the point. The first panel of Figure 7 plots the 
M2-to-GDP ratio as of end-2000, and the dollarisation ratios for 1999. Offshore centres are 
singled out in the figure by a square marker. As can be seen, three of them are clear outliers 
relative to what appears to be a significant negative association. Once offshore centres are 
excluded from the sample, a simple regression of financial depth on deposit dollarisation yields a 
highly significant and negative correlation. Simultaneity is certainly a concern here, as financial 
underdevelopment and FD may be merely symptoms of the same structural problems, without 
any causal connection between each other. However, the second panel shows that the same 
negative link (this time significant at the 5 percent level) is verified using the restrictions index. 
The fact that legal restrictions on onshore dollarisation –seldom modified and largely 
independent of the current macroeconomic context –are negatively correlated with financial 
depth suggests, if not that FD inhibits the deepening of the financial sector, at least that the 
disintermediation effect typically attributed to the use of legal limits as a way to prevent or undo 
FD have been overstated.
 44  
In sum, while concerns related to financial fragility seem to be supported by the 
evidence, there seems to be little empirical ground for the foregone conclusion that dollarised 
countries are compensated with the benefit of more liquid domestic financial markets. 
 
4.3.  Dollarisation and growth 
The final test of the net effect of FD lies in its implication for growth and output volatility. 
However, to my knowledge there are no empirical studies that systematically address this issue.
45 
  The previous discussion already suggests a number of different channels that may 
connect FD and output volatility. For example, if FD detracts from the capacity to use the real 
exchange as a buffer against real shocks, dollarised countries are likely to exhibit greater cyclical 
                                                 
43 The same results are obtained using the present database. 
44 A related argument (see. e.g., Reinhart et al., 2003) points at the sharp disintermediation that followed the attempts 
to de-dollarize the domestic banking sector through a forceful conversion to the local currency (including Bolivia in 
1982, Mexico in 1982, Peru in 1985,  Pakistan in 1998, and Argentina in 2002). However, since most of these attempts 
were conducted were a currency (and deposit) run was already underway, the specific role of the conversion in the 
contraction of the domestic banking sector cannot be readily identified. 
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volatility. If, in addition, financially dollarised economies, due their sensitivity to currency 
fluctuations, were more prone to suffering banking crises and episodes of capital flight, the sharp 
economic contractions typically induced by the latter would also contribute to output variability. 
By contrast, while there are reasons to believe that output volatility per se may inhibit growth 
(see, e.g., Ramey and Ramey, 1995), and that the adverse real effects of financial crises (more 
likely in dollarised economies) may be highly persistent, the link between FD and long-run 
growth is a priori less transparent.   
A cursory look at the data yields interesting preliminary insights. The first panel of Table 
6 reports the means test of growth and growth volatility (∆gdp_avg and ∆gdp_sd) for high a low 
dollarisation countries, defined as those with average deposit dollarisation ratios above or below 
the sample median. As can be seen, the latter display significantly faster and more stable growth 
than the former. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the correlations in the second panel. 
Thus, a bird’s eye look at the data appears to indicate that dollarisation does have a negative 
association with growth performance. 
This is consistent with the results of the cross-section regressions presented in Tables 7 
and 8. Table 7 reports the results for output volatility. In the first specification, which includes 
controls for initial GDP, initial human capital (proxied by secondary school enrolment, sec), 
terms of trade volatility (∆tt), and institutional quality, plus three regional dummies, dollarisation 
is significantly and positively related with volatility. However, the potential endogeneity of 
dollarisation certainly qualifies the previous result. Instruments for FD in this context are bound 
to be controversial, since most of them could be linked, at least theoretically, to output volatility. 
Moreover, our main candidate, restrictions on dollar deposits, turns out to be correlated with the 
dependent variable (column 2). The portfolio view of FD suggests a possible alternative: the 
volatility of inflation and the real devaluation rates (∆p_sd  and ∆rer, respectively), are both 
uncorrelated with the residuals of regression (1) and correlated with deposit dollarisation 
(explaining close to 30% of the cross-country variability of dollar_avg). In turn, the positive link 
between FD and output volatility is not lost when I instrument the latter by these two variables. 
The previous result still holds after controlling for size (measured as the dollar GDP at the 
beginning of the period) and including an industrial country dummy.
46 
However, the efforts to trace this link to the presence of balance sheet effects are more 
disappointing. Under this hypothesis, FD attenuates or reverts the expected countercyclical 
                                                 
46 Business cycles tend to be milder in industrial countries where FD is virtually null, and in large economies where 
more developed (peso-denominated) local financial market tend to substitute for foreign dollar borrowing. In both 
cases, the ommited variable may bias the results ––although size proved not to be a significant driver of domestic FD, 
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behaviour of exchange rates: ultimately, large devaluations in highly dollarised economies may 
lead to episodes of financial distress in line with the findings of section 4.2. To capture this 
channel, I include the correlation between output and exchange rate changes, which should 
increase with FD, and the number of capital account reversals, sudden stops, to capture the 
presence of sharp disruptions in local financial markets.
47 While both variables yield the expected 
positive sign, the coefficient of FD is almost unchanged, confirming the robustness of the link. 
However, the result should be taken with a pinch of salt. The fact that it cannot be clearly 
accounted for in terms of the channels discussed above, combined with the lack of a fully 
convincing instrument, suggests the need for further research. 
As noted in section 2, the FD literature that emphasizes the incidence of the net aggregate 
currency mismatch had focused primarily on external foreign currency liabilities, particularly 
bonded debt.
48 While this does not deny the relevance of onshore dollarisation as a source of 
financial distress, offshore dollarisation certainly played a role in recent financial crises and helps 
explain the ruinous consequences of currency collapses in economies where onshore dollarisation 
was only marginal. In principle, we would expect to observe a negative link between measures of 
offshore dollarisation and output volatility, as cyclical variations or sharp declines in the value of 
the local currency are amplified by a deterioration in the capacity to pay of local debtors 
(including the government). This link is explored in the last three columns in Table 7, where I 
replicate the previous tests using the ratio of (private plus public) foreign-denominated bonded 
debt over GDP (dollar_bond_ avg) as a measure of the external dollarisation. In this case, As can 
be seen, output volatility is positively and significantly correlated with the level of foreign 
currency bonds for non-industrial economies –but not for industrial ones– even after controlling 
for economic size, real exchange rate cyclicality, and sudden stops. 
Finally, Table 8 reports the results for the growth regressions. First, the average growth 
rate is regressed on the average dollarisation ratio and a group of standard controls such as initial 
per capita GDP, initial human capital (proxied by the ratio of secondary school enrolment at the 
beginning of the period, sec), the average investment-to-GDP ratio (invgdp_avg) and population 
growth (popg_avg), and regional dummies. As the table indicates, dollarisation is negatively 
associated with growth. Endogeneity, again, is a natural obstacle, this time aggravated by the fact 
that nearly all conceivable instrument has been related in one way or another with growth by the 
vast growth literature. As before, we resort to the restrictions index, a second best choice that, to 
                                                 
47 Similar results were obtained including, instead, the number of banking or currency crises, and excluding offshore 
financial centres. 
48 See, e.g., Eichengreen et al (2003) and Berganza and García Herrero (2003). FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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the extent that it represents a long-standing legal arrangement, should in principle be little 
influenced by growth performance. The IV results are even stronger, almost doubling the FD 
coefficient without altering the others, and robust to the inclusion of economic size and the 
sudden stop dummy.  
As before, the table tests the impact of external dollarisation, this time with no success. 
Indeed, the coefficient turns positive when deposit dollarisation is dropped to gain observations, 
and is (barely) significant at 14 percent for the sub-sample of developing economies (column 7). 
This positive association may due to the fact that virtually all external debt in developing 
economies is denominated in foreign currency. Then, inasmuch as fast growth tend to facilitate 
access to international bond markets, the positive connection between the former and a larger 
external debt-to-GDP ratio may be simply reflecting the reverse causality. 
Overall, these findings suggest that FD has a detrimental effect on the real economy. 
While more detailed and longer data are still needed to address potential endogeneity problems 
more conclusively, this preliminary exploration supports the view that, for a dollarised 
developing economy, the growth path is likely to be slower and more hectic than for the rest. 
 
4.4.  Robustness: Using a matching approach 
Consider the following linear specification yit =  Βxit + ΓDit + εit, where y is the variable under 
study (for example, the growth rate),  D is our “treatment” (for example, the degree of financial 
dollarisation), x is a vector of additional regressors, and ε is the error term. If the link between the 
y and any x is non-linear, and if x is, in addition, correlated with D, the estimated coefficient of D 
could erroneously capture the non-linear part of the link between y and x. The matching 
approach, which consists in “matching” observations that are associated with similar values of 
the regressors, can be used to deal with the possibility of this “selection on observables” bias.  
  The matching approach attempts to reproduce the conditions of a natural experiment by 
comparing treated and untreated observations with similar characteristics. An efficient way of 
conducting this comparison is by matching observations according to their treatment propensity 
score,  s –in this case, the probability of being financially dollarised– as a function of the 
additional regressors, x. In this way, a multidimensional problem (matching countries based on 




49 I use this approach here to verify the robustness of the cross-country results on 
inflation, output volatility and growth reported above. 
To implement this approach, I need to define the treatment, and the specification to 
estimate the propensity score. For the first purpose, I construct a high dollarisation dummy 
(highdoll) equal to one for those observations that exhibit a dollarisation ratio above the sample 
median of 20 percent, and define high-dollarisation observations (highdoll = 1) as my treatment 
group –leaving low-dollarisation observations as the control group. In turn, I estimate the 
propensity score as a logit function of highdoll in terms of the controls included in the cross-
section regressions that I want to check. I use models 5 and 6 in Table 4 for the case of inflation 
(in line with those results, I expect that the inclusion of the average money growth rate should 
sensibly reduce the incidence of FD on inflation), model 5 of Table 7 for output volatility, and 
model 1 of Table 8 for growth.
50 
Once that all observations are scored and ranked accordingly, I compute two alternative 
matching estimators: the stratification estimator (STE) and the nearest neighbour estimator (NN). 
The results, summarized in Table 9, broadly confirm the previous findings. Inflation is higher in 
dollarised economies, even after controlling for the rate of broad money growth. FD is also 
associated with greater output volatility –although the coefficient is smaller when the 
stratification estimator is used. Finally, growth rates are, on average, sensibly smaller in 





Box 4. Matching Estimators 
 
I compute the matching estimators reported in Table 9 in the following way. First, I estimate the 
propensity score, s, by running a logit regression of the treatment (highdoll) on the vector of 
regressors x included in the original linear regression. Then, I rank the observations according to 
their estimated propensity scores and group them into 3 strata. The equivalence between 
matching based on the full set of regressors and matching based on the propensity score applies 
only to treatments and controls on the common support of s. To ensure that this is the case, I 
discard countries with a propensity score lower than the lowest (or higher than the highest) 
                                                 
49 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Dehejia and Wahba (1999), and Heckman, et al (1997) for details, and Persson 
(2001) and Edwards and Magendzo (2002) for recent applications to macroeconomic problems. 
50 Dummies are dropped in all cases. 
51 Reassuringly, substituting highdoll for dollar in specification N of Table NN yields a coefficient of -0.1 and a t of -
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among treated observations. Thus, while the treatment to control ratio increases with the 
estimated propensity score, there are always both treatments and controls in each stratum.  
After checking that the score has successfully formed homogenous strata (using 
an equality of means test between treatments and controls within each stratum for all the 
regressors), I estimate the treatment effect (namely, the impact of high dollarisation on 
the variable of interest) using two alternative matching estimators: the stratification 
estimator (STE), and the nearest neighbour estimator (NN).  
This STE is computed as the weighted average of the average differences in the 
dependent variable of interest between high- and low-dollarisation groups within each stratum, 
weighing each difference by the number of treated observation included in the stratum. More 
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 In  turn,  the  NN  matches each treated observation with the untreated observation 
with which it has the smallest difference in propensity score. Note that this implies that 
the same control may be paired with more than one treated observation, and that not all 
controls are used by the procedure. After all treated observations are matched, the NN 
simply conducts a means test between the treatments and the selected controls. 
  
 
4.5.  Is euroisation different? 
Eastern European economies provide perhaps the most striking example of a growing FD trend. 
A close look at individual countries within this group reveals that, with different patterns, and 
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remained stable or increased in recent years (Figure 4).
52 Yet the dollarisation debate in Europe 
has been dominated by a focus on official euroisation, undoubtedly influenced by the prospect of 
monetary integration –and the belief in its inevitability–, at the expense of a discussion on de 
facto euroisation, on which surprisingly little has been done (another reason why FD tends to be 
mistakenly perceived as a Latin American issue). 
  The surge of FD in Europe could be in principle attributed, at least in part, to the 
prospects of monetary integration with the euro area. This influence materializes through 
increased trade and financial links with Euroland, the growing euro-orientation of exchange rate 
regimes (which derive much of their credibility from an eventual adoption of the euro), or even 
the benign view of financial euroisation by the local authorities (see, e.g., Padoa-Schioppa, 
2002). In this regard, euroisation may be tolerated (and even encouraged) as a transition 
phenomenon in the path to full monetary integration; indeed, new and prospective EMU 
members may find it difficult to restrict the spontaneous euroisation of their financial systems 
given the restrictions the membership imposes regarding capital mobility. In sum, FD may be 
viewed as the reflection of the growing acceptance of the euro as store of value, in anticipation of 
official euroisation. 
  Is this euro difference visible in the data? More precisely, is FD, presumably due to an 
increasing use of euro-denominated deposits, deeper in Europe than elsewhere? One can start to 
answer this question by checking whether dollarisation for Eastern European countries is indeed 
higher than what would be explained by its drivers. With this in mind, I compare the predicted 
deposit dollarisation ratio (computed using model 6 of Table 3) with actual ratios for the years 
1999 and 2001 (Figure 8). The objective of the exercise is twofold. On the one hand, to check 
whether these countries present consistently higher FD ratios than predicted. On the other, to 
examine whether such deviations tended to increase in the two years following the launch of the 
euro. At first sight, the answer to both questions appears to be positive. With the exception of 
Estonia and Poland, Eastern European countries exhibit FD ratios at or above the predicted 
values, which in most cases increased (albeit slightly) after 1999, pushing the average deviation 
from 5.3 percent in 1999 up to 8.6 percent in 2001.  
  However, these deviations are not large enough to conclude that the proximity of the euro 
zone alters the nature of FD in Europe.
53 On the contrary, the basic determinants identified in 
section 3 appear to account for FD in the region reasonably well. Moreover, FD in Eastern 
                                                 
52 The initial levels may have reflected in many cases a transitory valuation effect, namely, the combination of a 
rapidly depreciating real exchange rate and a relatively stable currency composition of deposits. 
53 From a statistical perspective, if we add a Eastern European dummy to the previous specification, the coefficient is 
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Europe predates euro convergence (as witness, for example, the cases of Poland or Hungary) and 
only gradually is the euro becoming a driving factor. This explains why the euro share of foreign 
currency deposits rose only marginally in 2001 in most cases (pushing the average from 31 to 
33.1 percent) without displacing the dollar (Figure 9).
54 Thus, the increase in euro deposits –
sometimes hailed as a signal of euro expansion– largely mirrors a parallel increase in dollar 
deposits. In sum, while the euro has successfully replaced former European currencies 
(particularly, the Deutsche mark) as store of value, the widespread and growing FD that 
characterized Eastern Europe in recent years cannot be attributed to a renewed demand for euro 
assets. 
  If euroisation is not ostensibly different from dollarisation in terms of its drivers, what 
about its consequences? Can we say that the conclusions drawn in this section apply to the case 
of prospective EMU members in the same way as to, say, Latin American economies? The 
answer here needs to be even more nuanced than in the previous case, since there is simply not 
enough evidence since the inception of the euro to make an empirical judgement. 
  While an analysis of the consequences of euro integration far exceeds the scope of this 
paper, it would be naïve not to recognize a number of factors that make euroisation unique. First, 
EMU as an end-condition qualifies the prudential concerns highlighted in this section, inasmuch 
as it reduces the probability of sudden exchange rate fluctuations by increasing the incentives to 
quasi-peg to the euro –even at a pre-accession stage– and enhancing the credibility of such an 
arrangement.
55 In this regard, financial euroisation in EMU accession countries is comparable to 
(and face similar risk as) FD under a credible peg. Although a sudden regime switch (and, in 
particular, a sharp real depreciation of the local currency) is likely to have the same damaging 
economic consequences as in any other financially dollarised economy, it represents an event risk 
that, in the context of a euroised Eastern European economy, it is arguably a remote possibility. 
Second, it poses a signalling problem that resembles the case of FD under a currency board: how 
can local governments (and the ECB) voice prudential concerns about financial euroisation 
without undermining the confidence on the forthcoming monetary integration –itself a powerful 
commitment mechanism for policy reform? Where would these risks be coming from if not from 
                                                 
54 The previous comparison excludes Hungary and the Slovak Republic, for which there is no data for 2000, and 
Kosovo, and Serbia and Montemegro, which are officially dollarized.  
55 Thus, the Ecofin Council report to the European Council on the exchange rate aspects of enlargment (Ecofin, 2000), 
still the ECB’s last word on the issue, states that “[p]otential EU members wishing to join ERM II relatively swiftly 
after accession are already now expected to consider their policies with a view to their prospective membership in 
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the failure of the convergence process? This may explain why position of Eastern European 
governments on FD can be best described as one of benign neglect –and why the ECB has been 
so reticent to express its views on the issue.  
  However, as long as monetary integration is not guaranteed, the implications of 
euroisation should be in principle no different than those of dollarisation. As ECB Vice-President 
Lucas Papademos (2004) reminds us, the high degree of de facto euroisation in Croatia “may 
entail some specific financial stability risks, especially if the degree of de facto euroisation in 
assets and liabilities does not match. These risks call for tight prudential regulation…While the 
adoption of the euro will eventually do away with these problems, it should not be regarded 
simply as a means to the end of overcoming these risks. Rather, the challenge is to enhance the 
attractiveness of financial intermediation in local currency, which would help to lessen the 
incentives to use foreign currencies in domestic transactions.” This argument could be applied, 
with only marginal rewording, to the rest of Eastern Europe –particularly in those many cases in 
which, unlike Croatia, FD still favours the dollar. 
  
5. FINAL  REMARKS 
 
The previous section showed that financially dollarised economies tend to display a greater 
sensitivity of domestic prices to money creation and –possibly as a result– higher inflation rates, 
a greater propensity to suffer systemic banking crises, and a slower and more volatile output 
growth, without any visible gain in terms of domestic financial depth. In sum, the evidence 
confirms the concerns typically associated with FD –and casts doubt on the financial 
intermediation argument often invoked in its favour. Overall, these findings provide a case for 
promoting de-dollarisation as an active policy.  
  The discussion of the main FD drivers in section 3 offers some guidance as to how to 
proceed. In particular, the preliminary evidence advices in favour of a monetary policy aimed at a 
stable inflation in a context of a flexible exchange rate regime (as suggested by the portfolio 
approach), combined with reliable institutions –although the specific institutional aspect involved 
(protection of creditors rights? monetary institutions that prevent inflationary surprises?) is not 
fully clear from the empirical evidence. 
However, the persistent dollarisation levels exhibited by many well-managed economies 
around the globe suggest that a sound monetary policy and better institutions may not be 
sufficient. Moreover, policy credibility and institutional quality take time to build –and, to the 
extent that they tend to be eroded during crises episodes, may take longer in financially dollarised FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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economies. Even in a best-case scenario in which these aspects are properly addressed, there may 
still be market imperfections that ultimately favour dollar intermediation. For example, a high 
correlation between currency and default risk (a significant dollarisation driver proxied in Table 3 
by the cyclical behaviour of the real exchange rate) may be largely due to FD, as dollarised 
debtors tend to go bankrupt after a sharp devaluation. Thus, dollarisation can generate its own 
seed and, to the extent that it involves a negative externality, should be addressed through 
prudential regulation. Ultimately, the tests indicate that the long-run cost of reducing onshore 
dollarisation through legal restrictions are rather small. 
It is on these grounds that an active de-dollarisation strategy can be formulated. Any such 
strategy should entail a two-way approach.
56 On the one hand, financial regulation and safety nets 
should be revised to address ex-ante the factors that favour the use of the dollar. On the other, 
peso instruments should be introduced and promoted to limit the impact of more stringent 
regulation in terms of domestic financial intermediation. 
On the first front, one thing to note is that standard prudential best practices have 
traditionally addressed currency imbalances only at the bank level and through limits on open 
currency positions, and have remained silent on the higher credit risk of dollar loans to non-dollar 
earners. The use of prudential norms to limit the currency exposure at the firm level has started to 
gained attention only recently, after the limits of existing regulations became apparent in the 
recent banking crises in Argentina or Uruguay.
57 In this regard, the menu goes from proportional 
tax-like measures (such as higher risk weights or provisioning requirements for dollarised bank 
assets) to simpler quantitative limits (such as maximum loan dollarisation ratios or restrictions on 
the application of dollar funds). 
In addition, in those economies where dollar intermediation is allowed, financial safety 
apply uniformly across currencies. Examples abound: currency-blind deposit insurance schemes 
and liquid asset requirements, and even the traditional lender-of-last-resort liquidity assistance by 
the central bank, effectively discriminate in favour of highly dollarised banks that are more 
exposed to balance sheet effects. Given the positive correlation between exchange rate risk and 
credit risk in financially dollarised economies, any safety net would be typically more valuable 
for dollar instruments, and needs to be priced accordingly. This can be done, for example, 
through a larger deposit insurance contribution on dollar deposits, or a liquid asset requirements 
                                                 
56 See Levy Yeyati (2003) for a detailed discussion along these lines. 
57 See Levy Yeyati et al. (2004). Not surprisingly, it is in those countries that the prudential rules are being revised 
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proportional to the dollar share of the bank’s liabilities, in both cases increasing the ex-ante cost 
of dollar intermediation.
58 
This prudential approach that reduces the appeal of dollar assets needs to be 
complemented with the development of peso markets that enhance the attractiveness of peso 
substitutes. While the Chilean and Israeli precedents suggest that inflation-indexed assets may 
have good chances to compete with dollar assets in inflation prone economies, indexation is not 
necessary to foster demand for local currency deposits in low inflation countries, and have played 
no role in recent experiencies in Poland or post-Tequila Mexico. Indeed, indexation is not free 
from contractual risk: experiences in Argentina and Uruguay in the late 70s ended up in forceful 
de-indexation when inflation picked up.
59  
Peso substitutes involve not only (indexed and non-indexed) local currency deposits and 
loans, but also the domestic capital market, essential to substitute peso domestic debt for 
dollarized external debt. That was the path chosen by countries such as Australia (due to a 
growing concern about currency mismatches after floating its currency in 1984) and Mexico 
(after the cautionary lesson of the 1994 Tequila crisis).  The historical record on de-dollarisation 
also highlights the leading role of public sector debt management in the provision of liquidity and 
benchmark issues for the new market at the start-up stage.
60 International financial institutions 
(IFIs) have also a role to play in a de-dollarisation strategy. As is well known, residents in 
developing economies hold important stocks of foreign assets due to credit and confiscation risk, 
which is only partially correlated with the currency risk that underlies onshore FD. In the absence 
of peso-denominated investment-grade assets, the offshorisation of domestic savings 
automatically reduces the supply of peso funds and increase liability dollarisation, even in a 
context of stable inflation and floating exchange rates. If so, IFIs can issue high-grade local-
currency paper and use the proceeds to fund peso loans to developing economies (or swap 
existing ones). By decoupling currency from country risk, these issues would meet the demand of 
resident investors willing to take a position in their own currency but wary of speculative assets –
or local pension funds willing to reduce their country exposure.
61 In so doing, they would reduce 
                                                 
58 Prudential limits such as restrictions on deposit insurance or commitments not to bailout dollarized debtors are hard 
to honour during a massive meltdown; hence, the emphasis of ex-ante costs as opposed to contingent threats. 
59 Argentina provides yet another, more recent example of the contractual uncertainty that may undermine indexation: 
to mitigate the impact of the currency collapse on dollar debtors, dollar mortgages were pesified and indexed to the CPI 
in early 2002, only to be re-indexed to a (flatter) wage index a few months down the road. 
60 See Bordo et al. (2002). Regulations limiting the financial choices of institutional investors (particularly, pension 
funds) have often contributed to reduce these early costs (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and, more recently, Poland are 
good examples). 
61 The role of IFIs in decoupling sovereign and currency risk has been highlighted by Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(2004). The focus on resident savers as the prime targets of local-currency IFI bonds is emphasised in Levy Yeyati 
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the substantial currency exposure introduced by dollarised official lending, while helping to start 
up a market for long peso securities. 
In sum, while sound and credible monetary and fiscal policies, and reliable institutions 
are necessary conditions for any successful de-dollarisation strategy, they are not sufficient. If de-
dollarisation is to be taken as a policy objective, a proactive agenda with specific measures to 
mitigate the presence of dollar-friendly externalities and to enhance the attractiveness of peso 
substitutes is needed to complement long-term policies. Ultimately, the economic implications of 
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Table 1. Deposit dollarisation and inflation 
 
    Balanced  sample 




Dollarisation Inflation Dollarisation Inflation
mean  19.8  21.5 46.3 24.7 65.5 35.8 30.4 
median  15.6  17.8 15.8 18.3 17.4 30.0 24.8 
Obs.  51  31 31 15 15 12 12 
min  0.1  0.1 2.1 0.6 3.0  12.6  3.9 
1990 
max 85.8  85.8 432.8 85.8 432.8 66.6 101.5 
mean  31.4  27.5 11.5 32.6  3.9  44.0 11.0 
median  27.8  18.7 3.1 16.3 3.7 45.5 9.5 
Obs.  97  31 31 15 15 12 12 
min  0.1  0.5 -0.9 1.5 -0.9  17.5  -0.8 
2000 
max 93.2  92.4 187.2 92.4  10.5  81.2  37.6 
*Due to data availability, for transition economies I use 1995 as the early date. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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Table 2. Dollar liabilities over GDP: alternative sources 
(non-industrial countries excluding offshore financial centers; balanced sample) 
 
 







term debt  Total
* 
Full sample 
mean 5.89  9.96  1.28  37.46  54.60 
median 4.16  7.43  0  25.35  44.10 
Obs. 59  59  59  59  59 
min 0  0  0  0  8.03 
1995 
max 26.96  60.98  35.02  222.65  250.78 
mean 9.03  13.93  3.32  36.54  62.82 
median 8.23  9.52  0  26.36  50.54 
Obs. 59  59  59  59  59 
min 0.02  0  0  0  15.62 
2000 
max 37.61  126.91  25.75  148.64  157.15 
Emerging economies 
mean 6.90  14.78  4.28  17.07  43.03 
median 7.30  10.91  1.80  9.99  42.60 
Obs. 17  17  17  17  17 
min 0.22  2.66  0  0  11.97 
1995 
max 17.20  53.81  35.02  72.90  83.69 
mean 9.76  13.74  8.49  16.25  48.24 
median 8.41  12.30  6.44  7.91  50.42 
Obs. 17  17  17  17  17 
min 0.03  3.03  0  0  17.25 
2000 
max 30.72  25.44  25.75  69.87  79.28 
Non-emerging economies 
Mean 5.48  8.01  0.07  45.72  59.28 
median 3.74  4.70  0  32.03  44.36 
Obs. 42  42  42  42  42 
min 0  0  0  3.22  8.03 
1995 
max 26.96  60.98  2.83  222.65  250.78 
Mean 8.73  14.01  1.23  44.76  68.72 
median 8.06  7.06  0  33.06  52.47 
Obs. 42  42  42  42  42 
min 0.02  0  0  2.66  15.62 
2000 




Table 2. Dollar liabilities over GDP: Alternative sources (continued) 
 







term debt  Total
* 
Latin America 
mean 6.81  15.27  1.26  28.49  51.83 
median 4.83  10.55  0  21.00  45.07 
Obs. 18  18  18  18  18 
min 0  0.92  0  4.97  19.76 
1995 
max 26.96  60.98  8.31  96.54  111.95 
mean 10.85  26.07  3.88  22.21  63.01 
median 10.00  13.39  0  19.74  50.00 
Obs. 18  18  18  18  18 
min 0.02  3.07  0  2.55  18.82 
2000 
max 37.61  126.91  25.75  71.11  157.15 
Transition Economies 
mean 6.04  12.32  1.01  47.69  67.06 
median 4.10  9.48  0  32.60  55.85 
Obs. 40  40  40  40  40 
min 0  0  0  0  11.97 
1995 
max 26.96  60.98  8.31  222.65  250.78 
mean 9.16  16.97  2.83  43.31  72.27 
median 8.69  10.67  0  30.27  60.83 
Obs. 40  40  40  40  40 
min 0.02  0  0  0  17.25 
2000 
max 37.61  126.91  25.75  148.64  157.15 
 
Note: Excludes outliers: Nicaragua and Sao Tome & Principe. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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Table 3. Dollarisation drivers 
Dependent variable: Deposit dollarisation ratio (dollar) 
 dollar_avg  a dollar  (1999) 
         Unrestricted             
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
restrictions  -0.064*** -0.053*** -0.066*** -0.059***   -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.073*** -0.064*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)    (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.013) 
∆p_avg a  1.694*** 0.999**  0.755  1.135  1.302  0.561  0.357  -0.190  0.376  -0.123  -0.183 
  (0.405) (0.503) (0.541) (0.781)  (0.850)  (1.208) (1.126) (1.264) (1.083) (1.211)  (1.055) 
mvp a   0.297***  0.283***  0.301***  0.320***  0.359***  0.393***  0.474***  0.391***  0.451*** 0.391*** 
   (0.075) (0.081) (0.084)  (0.090)  (0.089) (0.100) (0.089) (0.096) (0.082) (0.109) 
gdppc_i     -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.047***  -0.059***  -0.014  -0.035     -0.054*** 
     (0.013) (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.016) (0.027) (0.024)      (0.014) 
rer_cyc      -0.100**  -0.128**  -0.120**  -0.096**  -0.124** -0.093** -0.114**  -0.122** 
       (0.045) (0.053)  (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.050)  (0.042)  (0.050) (0.054) 
composite_1            -0.082   -0.105***    
             (0.054)  (0.029)    
Cpia_1              -0.082   -0.116**  
               (0.056)  (0.053)  
jurepeg_1                   -0.046 
                     (0.062) 
lysfix_1                     
                      
constant  0.259*** 0.192*** 0.558*** 0.546***  0.527***  0.662***  0.334*  0.787*** 0.228*** 0.663*** 0.625*** 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.106) (0.121)  (0.150)  (0.134) (0.193) (0.230) (0.042) (0.211)  (0.120) 
Observations 106  105  100  91  68  92  81  68  81  68  85 
R-squared 0.26  0.39  0.46  0.47 0.42  0.50  0.56  0.54  0.56  0.52 0.52 
R o b u s t   s t a n d a r d   e r r o r s   i n   p a r e n t h e s e s .             
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a Computed based on monthly data for the periods 1990-2001 (models 1 to 5) and 1990-1999 (models 6 to 11).  




Table 4. Dollarisation and inflation 














  1  2  3  4 5 6 
∆m2  0.564*** 0.321***  0.395**      0.904*** 
  (0.081) (0.086)  (0.158)      (0.104) 
∆gdp  -0.243*** -0.351*** -0.145  -3.914** -4.010** -1.551** 
  (0.079)  (0.102)  (0.147)  (1.737) (1.694) (0.758) 
∆intrate  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)     
∆er  0.324***  0.287***  0.381***     
  (0.071)  (0.080)  (0.099)     
∆m2_dollar_avg    0.746***       
    (0.262)       
∆m2_dollar      0.471*     
      (0.242)     
dollar_avg       0.534**  0.639***  0.186* 
        (0.226) (0.201) (0.101) 
composite       -0.042**  -0.032  0.001 
        (0.021) (0.030) (0.013) 
latam       0.062  0.059  0.019 
        (0.049) (0.048) (0.024) 
safrica       0.117*  0.121**  0.054 
        (0.061) (0.061) (0.033) 
transition        0.022 0.001 0.052 
        (0.094) (0.085) (0.057) 
restrictions       -0.007     
       (0.014)     
constant  -0.007 -0.003  0.005  0.190**  0.166*  -0.023 
  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.043)  (0.075) (0.085) (0.039) 
Observations  2961  2050  1071  98 98 96 
R-squared  0.85  0.86  0.89  0.42 0.42 0.83 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and, in fixed-effect specifications, to clustering by country-
specific observations, in parentheses.   
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a Instruments: ∆gdp_avg, composite_avg, latam, safrica, transition and  restrictions.     




Table 5. Dollarisation and financial fragility 
 
Dependent variable: Crisis dummy 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
∆er   0.588*** -0.829  -0.610  -1.205 -1.209 -2.321 
 (0.158)  (0.706)  (1.128)  (1.393) (1.409) (1.552) 
FL/FA 0.000***  0.003**  0.005** 0.006*  0.006*  0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
dollar 0.745**  0.674*  0.676 0.477 0.477 0.411 
 (0.348)  (0.359)  (0.416)  (0.426) (0.428) (0.448) 
FL/FA * ∆er   0.072**  0.101**  0.122*  0.122*  0.146 
   (0.031)  (0.046)  (0.064) (0.064) (0.095) 
dollar * ∆er   1.310*  2.027*  2.543*  2.544*  3.196** 
   (0.695) (1.049) (1.347) (1.373) (1.335) 
∆p     -1.549  -1.510  -1.508  -1.092 
     (1.053) (1.127) (1.085) (1.177) 
∆tt     0.014  0.012  0.012  0.011 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
realint      -0.000** -0.000*  -0.000* -0.000** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 M2/reserves      -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
     (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
∆gdp     0.001  -0.006  -0.006  -0.001 
     (0.033) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) 
private credit/gdp     -0.723  0.554  0.552  0.795 
     (1.112) (1.300) (1.293) (1.336) 
cash/assets      -0.944 -0.820 -0.820 -0.922 
     (1.014) (1.111) (1.110) (1.334) 
capital flows/gdp     -1.548  -0.498  -0.496  -0.575 
     (1.411) (1.425) (1.400) (1.536) 
gdppc_i      0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
composite_avg      -0.659*  -0.659*  -0.671* 
       (0.371) (0.371) (0.347) 
sudden stop       0.012  -0.243 
       (0.956) (0.903) 
currency crisis        1.109* 
        (0.617) 
constant  -3.555*** -3.493*** -2.455*** -2.737*** -2.737*** -2.912*** 
  (0.292) (0.300) (0.529) (0.481) (0.484) (0.496) 
Observations  1104  1104  535 483 483 483 
F - t e s t s         
  dollar + dollar *∆er    5.77 7.10 5.24 5.24 7.11 
  (p-value)    (0.016) (0.008) (0.022) (0.022) (0.008) 
  FL/FA + FL/FA*∆ er    5.27 4.86 3.56 3.57 2.33 
  (p-value)    (0.022) (0.027) (0.059) (0.059) (0.127) 
∆er+FL/FA*∆er+dollar*∆er    0.30 3.94 2.53 2.52 1.15 
  (p-value)    (0.583) (0.047) (0.112) (0.112) (0.283) 
Notes: All regressors lagged one period. The crisis dummy equals one for the first year of a banking crisis. 
Subsequent crisis years dropped from the sample. The variable dollar equals one if the deposit 
dollarisation ratio exceeds 10%. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 6. Dollarisation and growth 
Panel A. Means tests 






mean ∆gdp_avg)  0.035 0.026 -0.010 
  (0.015) (0.019) (0.002) 
mean (∆gdp_sd)  0.042 0.065 0.023 
  (0.023) (0.043) (0.000) 
Number of countries  64  60   
 
Note: Low (high) dollarisation countries are those with average dollarisation 
ratios below (above) the sample median (20%). 
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Table 7. Output volatility regressions 
Dependent variable: Growth volatility (∆gdp_sd) 
 OLS  OLS  IV  a IV b IV c OLS  d OLS d OLS d 




  1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 
dollar_avg  0.019** 0.047***  0.038*  0.038**  0.040**       
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)       
dollar_bond_avg        0.054** 0.193**  0.197** 
        (0.023)  (0.074)  (0.092) 
gdppc_i  0.007** 0.009**  -0.002  0.004*  0.005**  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sec  -0.029* -0.021  -0.021  -0.006  0.000  -0.021  -0.012  -0.024 
  (0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) 
∆tt_sd  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
composite_avg  0.000 -0.002 0.007  0.004  0.001 0.004  0.002  0.001 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
latam  -0.007 -0.008 -0.007  -0.013**  -0.011**  -0.004 -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
transition  0.011** 0.009  -0.001  -0.005  0.002  0.012  -0.003  0.010 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.019) (0.021) 
safrica  -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003 0.007  0.005 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
∆p_sd   -0.012            
    (0.013)           
∆er_sd    0.031         
    (0.093)         
restrictions    0.005*         
    (0.003)         
industrial        -0.022*** -0.017** -0.014**     
       (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)     
size      -0.002**  -0.002**     -0.000 
       (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.002) 
sudden stop       0.006**     0.008* 
         (0.002)      (0.005) 
rer_cyc       0.016*     0.018 
         (0.008)      (0.026) 
constant  0.022**  0.013  0.032*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.022**  0.015  0.016 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) 
Observations  73 66 66 66 66  103  82 80 
R-squared  0.59 0.64 0.44 0.55 0.62  0.32 0.31 0.36 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.               
a Instruments: ∆p_sd, ∆er_sd, gdppc_i, sec, ∆tt_sd, composite_avg, latam, transition and safrica. 
b Instruments: ∆p_sd, ∆er_sd, gdppc_i, sec, ∆tt_sd, composite_avg, industrial, size, latam, transition and safrica. 
c Instruments:  ∆p_sd, ∆er_sd, gdppc_i, sec, ∆tt_sd, composite_avg, sudden stop, rer_cyc, industrial, size, latam, 
transition and safrica. 
d Averages and standard deviations taken for the period 1993-2001 for which bond data is available. 
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Table 8. Growth regressions 
Dependent variable: Average growth rate (∆gdp_avg) 
 OLS  OLS  IV  a IV b IV c OLS  d OLS d 




  1 2 3  4  5  6 7 
dollar_avg  -0.016* -0.021**  -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.066***    
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.023)    
dollar_bond_avg        -0.006  0.059  0.107 
        (0.015) (0.047)  (0.071) 
gdppc_i  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***  0.020***  0.027*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007) (0.003) 
sec  -0.004 0.002 0.003  0.004  0.017  -0.071***  -0.055*** 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.021) (0.021) 
invgdp_avg  0.136*** 0.145*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.149*** 0.044  0.002 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.054)  (0.059) (0.054) 
popg_avg  0.418*** 0.424*** 0.595*** 0.555*** 0.629***  -0.572  -1.346*** 
  (0.130) (0.120) (0.185)  (0.179)  (0.187)  (0.366) (0.394) 
m2/gdp_avg  0.004 -0.004 0.007  0.005  -0.008  0.020* 0.010 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.011) (0.017) 
composite_avg  0.004 0.003 0.004  0.003  0.002  -0.028***  -0.024*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010) (0.008) 
latam  -0.009** -0.009**  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003  0.002  -0.007 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) 
transition  -0.012** -0.012**  -0.005 -0.006 -0.004  0.046***  0.012 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.012) (0.015) 
safrica  -0.013** -0.012**  -0.009 -0.008 -0.006  0.009  0.015 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009) 
size      -0.000      
      (0.001)      
currency  crisis      -0.001      
      (0.001)      
constant  0.011 0.011 0.008  0.010  0.007  0.032  0.057*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.019) (0.021) 
Observations  64 62 62  60  60  95 73 
R-squared  0.63 0.63 0.54  0.57  0.47  0.38  0.52 
Robust standard errors in  p a r e n t h e s e s .         
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a Instruments: gdppc_i, sec, invgdp_avg, popg_avg, M2/gdp_avg, composite_avg, latam, transition, safrica and 
restrictions. 
b Instruments: gdppc_i, sec, invgdp_avg, popg_avg, M2/gdp_avg, composite_avg, latam, transition, safrica, 
restrictions, size and currency crisis. 
c Instruments: dollar_bond_avg, gdppc_i, sec, invgdp_avg, popg_avg, M2/gdp_avg, composite_avg, latam, 
transition, safrica, restrictions, size and currency crisis. 




Table 9. Matching estimators 
   Stratification     Nearest Neighbour 
Dependent 
variable  Treatments  Controls Estimator     Treatments Controls  Estimator 
                     
                      
Inflationa  47  53  0.205     47  24  0.217 
         (4.040)           (4.387) 
                     
Inflationb  47  51  0.141     47  17  0.117 
         (2.676)           (1.955) 
                     
Output Volatilityc   28  39  0.007     28  16  0.014 
         (0.971)           (2.264) 
                     
Growthd  27  26  -0.012     27  18  -0.013 
         (-2.453)           (-2.121) 
               
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Observations matched according to a propensity score computed based on a logit model of highdoll 
on: 
a ∆gdp_avg composite_avg 
b ∆gdp_avg composite_avg ∆m _avg 
c gdppc_i sec ∆tt_sd composite_avg sudden stop rer_cyc 
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Figure 1. Regional distribution of non-industrial countries with deposit 























Note: Foreign currency loans sourced from De Nicoló et al. (2003) and Arteta (2002). 
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Figure 3. FD and inflation in transition economies (1995-2001) 
Note: Computed based on a balanced sample that includes: Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
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Figure 4. (cont.) Deposit dollarisation ratios in Eastern European economies 
 
 




































1998 1999 2000 2001  
 






























Notes: The trendline represents the locus of the fitted values of a simple regression of inflation elasticy with respect to 
changes in broad money on the average deposit dollarisation ratio (the elasticity is estimated as the coefficent of a 
simple "country-by-country" regression of the inflation rate on broad money changes excluding outliers). The 
regression cofficient is 0.773 with a t-statistic of 3.79. 
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Figure 6. Probability of a banking crisis as a function of the exchange rate change FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES 
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Note: Square markers represent offshore countries. The trendline represents the locus of the fitted values of a simple 
regression of the M2-to-GDP ratio by end-2000 on the deposit dollarisation ratio in 1999, excluding offshore 
observations. The regression cofficient is -0.55 with a t-statistic of -5.27. Obserrvations: 100. 
 



























Notes: The trendline represents the locus of the fitted values of a simple regression of the M2-to-GDP ratio  
by end-2000 on the restrictions index. The regression cofficient is 0.056 with a t-statistic of 1.98. Observations: 105. 
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Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definitions  (sources) 
∆p  Logarithmic difference of the CPI. (IMF’s World Economic Outlook [WEO]). 
∆er  Logarithmic difference of the nominal exchange rate (WEO). 
∆rer  ∆er-∆p 
restrictions 
Index of restrictiveness of rules on resident holdings of onshore foreign currency 
deposits as reported by the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAR), revised and expanded from De Nicoló et al. (2003), 
using their methodology. 
sec  School enrolment, secondary (% gross)  (The World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators [WDI]). 
∆m2  Logarithmic difference of M2 (IMF’s International Financial Statistics [IFS]). 
∆gdp  Logarithmic difference of real GDP (IFS). 
crisis  Dummy variable equal to one for the first crisis year, zero for non-crisis years (Caprio 
and Klingebiel, 2003).  
mvp  (var(∆p) – cov(∆p, ∆rer)) / (var(∆p) + var(∆rer) – 2cov(∆p, ∆rer))  
M2/GDP  Ratio of M2 over GDP (IFS). 
M2/reserves  Ratio of M2 over international reserves (IFS). 
cash/assets  Reserves of deposit money banks over assets of deposit money banks (IFS). 
private credit/gdp  Bank credit to the resident private sector over GDP (IFS). 
gdppc  GDP per capita denominated in US dollars (WEO). 
invgdp  Investment over GDP (WEO). 
intrate  Nominal interest rate (IFS). 
cpia  Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (The World Bank). 
composite  Neighed average of Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, 1999). 
dollar  Foreign currency deposits over total deposits in local deposit money banks (various 
sources). 
dollar_bond  Foreign currency external bonded debt over GDP (BIS, WEO). 
∆tt 
Logarithmic difference of terms of trade (exports as a capacity to import; constant 
LCU; WDI). 
FL / FA  Deposit money banks´ foreign liabilities over foreign assets (IFS). 
capital flows / gdp  Capital account + financial account + net errors and omissions (IFS). 
latam  Dummy variable for Latin American countries. 
transition  Dummy variable for transition countries. 
safrica  Dummy variable for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
rer_cyc  Country–by–country correlation between ∆gdp and ∆rer. 
jurepeg  Dummy variable for de jure exchange rate regime classification (Gosh Gulde and 
Wolf, 2003). 
lysfix  Dummy variable for pegged exchange rate regimes (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 
forthcoming). 
sudden stop  Dummy variable for sudden stops (Cavallo and Frankel, 2004). 
currency crisis  Dummy variable for currency crises (Glick and Hutchinson, 2001). 
size  Log of nominal GDP in US dollars 
highdoll  Dummy variable for dollar_avg greater than 20% 
Notes: x_avg and x_sd denote the country’s mean and standard deviation of x. x_1 denotes the value of the 




Table A2. Deposit dollarisation data: countries and periods covered 
 
Country Dollariz.  Country Dollariz.  Country Dollariz.  Country Dollariz. 
Albania 1992-2001  Ecuador*  1990-2001 Lebanon 1993-2001  Sierra  Leone  1993-1999
Angola 1995-2001  Egypt  1980-2001 Lithuania**  1993-2001  Slovak  Republic**  1991-2001
Antigua and Barbuda*  1979-2001  El Salvador*  1982-2001 Macedonia, FYR**  1997-2001  Slovenia**  1991-2001
Argentina* 1986-2001  Estonia**  1991-2001 Malawi  1994-2001  South  Africa  1991-2001
Armenia** 1992-2001  Ethiopia  1998-1999 Malaysia  1996-2001  Spain  1996-2001
Austria  1997-2001  Finland  1996-1999 Maldives  1981-1999  St. Kitts and Nevis*  1979-2001
Azerbaijan** 1992-2001  Georgia**  1992-2001 Malta  1975-1984  St.  Lucia*  1979-1999
Bahamas, The  1975-2001  Ghana  1995-2000 Mauritius  1992-1999  St. Vincent & Grens.*  1979-2001
Bangladesh 1987-2001  Greece  1990-2001 Mexico*  1991-2001  Sudan  1992-1998
Bahrain 1984-1997  Grenada*  1979-1999 Moldova**  1994-2001  Suriname*  1975 
Barbados* 1975-2001  Guatemala*  1995-2001 Mongolia**  1992-2001  Sweden  1994-2001
Belarus** 1992-2001  Guinea  1989-2001 Mozambique  1991-2001  Switzerland  1998-2001
Belize 1976-2001  Guinea-Bissau  1990-1996 Myanmar  1991-1999  Syrian  Arab  Republic  1975-1998
Bhutan 1993-2001  Haiti*  1994-2001 Netherlands 1990-2001  Tajikistan*  1996-2000
Bolivia* 1975-2001  Honduras*  1990-2001 Netherlands  Antilles*  1975-2001  Tanzania  1993-2001
Bosnia and Herzeg.**  1996-2001  Hong Kong  1991-2001 New Zealand  1990-2001  Thailand  1982-2001
Bulgaria**  1991-2001  Hungary**  1989-2001 Nicaragua*  1990-2001  Trinidad and Tobago  1993-2001
Cape Verde  1995-1999  Iceland  1978-1999 Nigeria  1994-2001  Turkey  1986-2001
Cambodia 1993-2001  Indonesia 1992-2001 Norway  1996-2000  Turkmenistan**  1993-2000
Chile* 1976-2001  Israel  1981-2001 Oman 1975-1999  Tonga 1994-1999
China,P.R.: Mainland  1998-2001  Italy  1996-2000 Pakistan 1990-1998  Uzbekistan  1997-1999
Colombia*  1990-1999  Jamaica*  1992-2001 Papua New Guinea  1976-1999  Uganda  1992-2000
Comoros 1998-2001  Japan  1996-2001 Paraguay*  1988-2001  Ukraine**  1992-2001
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1975-2001  Jordan  1990-1999 Peru*  1975-2001  United Arab Emirates  1981-2001
Costa Rica*  1990-2001  Kazakhstan**  1998-2001 Philippines  1982-2001  United Kingdom  1990-2001
Croatia** 1993-2001  Kenya  1995-2001 Poland** 1985-2001  Uruguay* 1981-2001
Czech Republic**  1993-2001  Korea  1990-2001 Qatar  1993-1999  Vanuatu  1981-1999
Cyprus 1991-1999  Kuwait 1981-1999 Romania**  1990-2001  Venezuela*  1994-2001
Denmark 1991-2001  Kyrgyz  Republic**  1995-2001 Russia**  1993-2001  Vietnam  1992-2001
Dominica*  1988-2001  Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1989-2001 Sao Tome & Principe  1995-2001  Yemen  1990-2001
Dominican Republic  1996-2001  Latvia**  1992-2001 Saudi Arabia  1975-2001  Zambia  1994-2001
         Zimbabwe  1993-1999
  Note: (*) denotes Latin American countries and (**) denotes transition economies. 




Table A3. Index of restrictions on holdings of foreign currency deposits by residents (as of beginning of 2000) 
 
Country Restrictions  Firms Households Prior  approval  Country Restrictions Firms Households Prior  approval 
Albania 0  .  . . Ghana 0 . . .
Angola  0 . .  .  Greece  0 . .  . 
Antigua  and  2 1 .  1  Grenada  2 1 1  . 
Argentina 0  .  .  .  Guatemala 5  2  2  1 
Armenia  0 . .  .  Guinea  0 . .  . 
Austria  0 . .  .  Guinea-Bissau  1 . .  1 
Azerbaijan  0  .  . .  Haití  1  1  . . 
Bahamas,  The 1 . .  1  Honduras  0 . .  . 
Bahrain  0  .  . .  Hungary  1  1  . . 
Bangladesh 3  1  1  1  Iceland  0  .  .  . 
Barbados 3  1  1 1  Indonesia 0  .  .  . 
Belarus  0 . .  .  Israel  0 . .  . 
Belice  1 . .  1  Italy  0 . .  . 
Bhutan 5  2  2  1  Jamaica 0  .  .  . 
Bolivia  0 . .  .  Japan  0 . .  . 
Bosnia  and  0 . .  .  Jordan  0 . .  . 
Brazil 2  1  1  .  Kazakhstan  0  .  .  . 
Bulgaria  0 . .  .  Kenya  0 . .  . 
Cambodia  0 . .  .  Korea  0 . .  . 
Cape  Verde  1 . .  1  Kuwait  0 . .  . 
Chile  0 . .  .  Kyrgyz  Republic  0 . .  . 
China: Mainland  2  1  .  1  Lao People’s  0  .  .  . 
China:  Hong  0 . .  .  Latvia  0 . .  . 
Colombia 3  1  2  .  Lebanon  0  .  .  . 
Comoros  1 . .  1  Lithuania  0 . .  . 
Congo,  Dem.  0 . .  .  Macedonia,  FYR  0 . .  . 
Costa Rica  0  .  .  .  Malawi  2  1  1  . 
Croatia  0 . .  .  Malaysia  3 . 2  1 
Cyprus 3  1  1  1  Maldives  0  .  .  . 
Czech Republic  0  .  .  .  Malta  3  1  1  1 
Denmark  0 . .  .  Mauritius  0 . .  . 
Dominica  4 1 2  1  México  2 1 1  . 
Ecuador  0 . .  .  Moldova  0 . .  . 
Egypt  0 . .  .  Mongolia  0 . .  . 
El  Salvador  0 . .  .  Mozambique  0 . .  . 
Estonia 0  .  .  .  Myanmar  3  1  1  1 
Etiopía 4  1  2  1  Netherlands  0  .  .  . 
Finland  0 . .  .  Netherlands  0 . .  . 




Table A4. Index of restrictions on holdings of foreign currency deposits by residents (as of beginning of 2000) 
(cont.) 
 
Country Index  Firms  Huseholds  Prior  approval  Country Index Firms Households  Prior  approval 
Nicaragu a  0   .   .. S u r i n a m e 0 . ..
Nigeria  1 .  .  1  Sweden  0 .  .  . 
Norway  0 .  .  .  Switzerland  0 .  .  . 
Oman  0  .  .  .  Syrian Arab Rep.  0  .  .  . 
Papua  New  1  1  . .  Tajikistan  0  .  . . 
Paraguay  0 .  .  .  Tanzania  0 .  .  . 
Peru 0  .  .  .  Thailand  4  1  2 1 
Philippines 0  .  .  . Tonga  4  2  2  . 
Poland 0  .  .  .  Trinidad &  0  .  .  . 
Qatar  0 .  .  .  Turkey  0 .  .  . 
Romania 0  . .  .  Turkmenistán  3  1  1  1 
Russia  0 .  .  .  Uganda  0 .  .  . 
Rwanda 3  1  1  1  Ukraine  1  .  .  1 
Sao Tome  0  .  .  .  United Arab E.  0  .  .  . 
Saudi Arabia  0  .  .  .  United Kingdom  0  .  .  . 
Sierra  Leone  0 .  .  .  Uruguay  0 .  .  . 
Slovak  Republic  1 .  .  1  Uzbekistán  0 .  .  . 
Slovenia  0 .  .  .  Vanuatu  0 .  .  . 
South  Africa  0 .  .  .  Venezuela  0 .  .  . 
Spain 0  .  .  .  Vietnam  2  1  1  . 
St. Kitts and  3  1  1  1  Yemen  0  .  .  . 
St.  Lucia  0 .  .  .  Zambia  0 .  .  . 
St. Vincent & G.  0  .  .  .  Zimbabwe  0  .  .  . 
Sudan 0  .  .  .           
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2001, based on De Nicoló et al. (2003).  
Firms and Households equal 1 if only documented proceeds of exports or remittances can be lodged to the account;  
2 if accounts are not permitted or are limited to a very narrow category of holder. Prior approval equals 1 if required.  
The restrictions index is computed as the sum of the three columns. 
 
 
 
 